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This dissertation examines the substantial and persistent variation in female 
representation observed across states and party caucuses in the US state legislatures.  I develop 
and test the theory of gendered civil society context and party strength to explain why female 
candidates are more likely to run for office in some places rather than others.  Gendered civil 
society context refers to the gender balance of civil society groups (e.g. unions, service 
organizations, advocacy groups, professional associations) in a party’s local strategic 
environment; party strength is defined as the capacity of political parties to influence candidate 
nomination.   
Two main hypotheses guide the project.  First, I hypothesize that when a party’s local 
gendered civil society context is comprised of female-dominated networks the emergence of 
female candidates is more likely compared to places where male-dominated networks wield 
more political power.   Second, I expect that the relationship between gendered civil society 
context and female candidate emergence is moderated by party strength.  I employ a multi-
method approach to evaluate these hypotheses using regression analysis with nationwide data 
and case studies of Georgia and New York, based on 30 semi-structured interviews with 
Democratic and Republican county party leaders. 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative results suggest that the theory of 
gendered civil society context does indeed provide a promising new explanation for candidate 
emergence.  The quantitative results indicate that within both parties, more politically active 
female-dominated industry groups (e.g. teachers unions) are associated with more female 
candidates.  Moreover, more politically active male-dominated industry groups (e.g. trade 
 
 
unions) are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office, but the same effect is 
not present on the Republican side.   
Interviews generated rich data about how candidates come to run for office, and they 
indicate that gendered civil society contexts impact the likelihood of female candidate emergence 
in both parties.  Party chairs in both Georgia and New York emphasized that prior community 
engagement is critical for successful candidacies.  However, as expected, the types of 
engagement and organizations mentioned did vary across the states and parties in ways that point 
to gendered differences in candidate pipelines.  Democratic chairs tend to mention professional 
and civic backgrounds of potential candidates that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, 
women’s rights) compared to those mentioned by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, 
business owners).  Moreover, the results suggest that candidate emergence within Republican 
networks is driven by personal connections within civil society groups in contrast to candidate 
emergence from the networks of advocacy and other stakeholder groups with strong institutional 
ties to Democratic party organizations.  Finally, while potential candidates who come forward on 
their own (i.e. self-starters) are common in both parties, Republican chairs seem to rely more 
heavily on self-starters.  This reliance on self-starters disadvantages women, who are less likely 
than men to run for office without being recruited. 
In sum, the dissertation argues that the gendered civil society context represents an 
innovative conception of candidate pipelines, which acknowledges party-based and gender-based 
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Introduction to Female Candidate Emergence in the US State Legislatures 
 
Introduction 
Despite recent gains, women are underrepresented in elective office at all levels of US 
government (CAWP 2019).  By now, it is well known that the Democratic Party outperforms the 
Republican Party in terms of female representation.  What receives far less scholarly attention is 
the substantial intraparty variation in female representation across the US state legislatures.  For 
instance, consider only seats held by Democrats in state houses.  Democratic caucuses have 
reached gender parity in many states, while in several others less than 25% of Democratic seats 
are held by women (Figure 1.1) 1.  While female representation across Republican-held seats is 
lower overall, they also exhibit a wide range of female seat-shares from around 30% in some 
states to less than 10% in several others (Figure 1.2).  Notably, as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate, 
these variations do not correlate with partisan compositions of legislatures.  In other words, a 
more Democratic legislature is not necessarily associated with a more gender-balanced 
Democratic caucus.  Existing theories do not sufficiently explain these variations.  With half of 
the population underrepresented in many states and within party caucuses, women miss 
opportunities to prepare for higher office and their perspectives and experiences are left out of 
important policy debates.  It is crucial to know why the prospects for aspiring female politicians 
are much more promising for some compared to their counterparts, even co-partisans, elsewhere. 
To this end, this dissertation explores why women are more likely to run for office in 
some places rather than others.  I focus on processes of candidate emergence because prior 
 
1 Nebraska is excluded from the analyses presented in this project because its state legislature is unicameral and 





research demonstrates that female candidates win elections at rates comparable to males, but 
women are much less likely to run for office in the first place (Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll 
and Sanbonmatsu 2013).    I develop and test the theory of gendered civil society context and 
party strength to explain variation in female candidate emergence.  Gendered civil society 
context refers to the gender balance of civil society groups (e.g. unions, service organizations, 
advocacy groups, professional associations) in a party’s local strategic environment; party 
strength is defined as the capacity of political parties to influence candidate nomination2. 
Two main hypotheses, which are described in detail in Chapter 2, guide the project.  
First, I hypothesize that when a party’s local gendered civil society context is comprised of 
female-dominated networks the emergence of female candidates is more likely compared to 
places where male-dominated networks wield more political power.  Second, I hypothesize that 
the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence is 
moderated by level of party strength.  I employ a multi-method approach to test these hypotheses 
using regression analysis and 30 semi-structured interviews with Democratic and Republican 
county party leaders across Georgia and New York. 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the following 
chapters suggest that the theory of gendered civil society context does indeed provide a 
promising new explanation for candidate emergence.  The quantitative results indicate that 
within both parties more politically active female-dominated industry groups (e.g. teachers 
unions) are associated with more female candidates.  Moreover, more politically active male-
dominated industry groups (e.g. trade unions) are associated with fewer Democratic women 
running for office, but unrelated to Republican female candidate emergence.   
 
2 The concept of party strength as defined here is sometimes referred to as “party centeredness”, especially in the 





Quantitative results do not support the party strength hypotheses, but qualitative analysis 
provides nuanced evidence about the role of party organizations in processes of candidate 
recruitment and emergence.  Interviews with county party leaders indicate that gendered civil 
society contexts impact the likelihood of female candidate emergence in both parties.  Party 
chairs in Georgia and New York emphasized that prior community engagement is critical for 
successful candidacies.  However, as expected, the types of engagement and organizations 
mentioned did differ across the states and parties in ways that point to gendered differences in 
candidate pipelines.  Democratic party chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds 
of potential candidates that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, women’s rights) 
compared to those mentioned by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, business owners).  
Moreover, the results suggest that candidate emergence within Republican networks is driven by 
personal connections within civil society groups in contrast to candidate emergence from the 
networks of advocacy and other stakeholder groups that have strong institutional ties to 
Democratic Party organizations.  Finally, while potential candidates who come forward on their 
own (i.e. self-starters) are common in both parties, the Republican chairs I interviewed seem to 
rely more heavily on self-starters, as opposed to trying to recruit candidates from the community.  
This reliance on self-starters disadvantages women who are less likely than men to run for office 
without being recruited (Moncrief et al. 2001, Lawless and Fox 2010, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 
2013).   
Overall, the dissertation demonstrates that the gendered civil society context represents 
an innovative conception of candidate pipelines, which acknowledges party-based and gender-
based differences and accounts for a broad array of politically relevant civil society actors that 





analysis of female representation across states and within party caucuses in US State Houses3.  I 
also describe the existing research aimed at explaining female representation in the American 





3 I refer to the lower chambers of US state legislatures as State Houses throughout the dissertation, but some states 





















































































Figure 1.1 - Female Representation in Democratic Caucuses of State Houses
and Democratic Seat-share, Average 2015 - 2019















































































Figure 1.2 - Female Representation in Republican Caucuses of State Houses
and Republican Seat-share, Avergage 2015 - 2019





Significance of Project 
On a normative level, for the pursuit of gender equality and the legitimacy of American 
democracy, it is crucial to know why the prospects for aspiring female politicians vary so much 
across states and party caucuses.  Scholars like Mansbridge (1999) argue that descriptive 
representation4, especially of historically marginalized groups, is critical to democratic 
legitimacy.  From this perspective, it is a moral imperative to understand the sources of 
inequality in political representation and address them accordingly.  Failure to do so may 
undermine democratic functions because citizens of the underrepresented group may feel 
disempowered and estranged from the government and lose trust in governing institutions.  In 
line with this view, this dissertation starts with the premise that it is important to have equitable 
descriptive representation for women and minority groups in democratic societies.  At the very 
least it is important to understand why the inequality that we observe is present. 
  Understanding female representation in US state legislatures is important for several 
practical reasons as well.  First, state legislators comprise an important pipeline for 
Congressional candidates and state-wide offices (Thomsen 2015).  Second, state legislatures 
govern major policy areas that fundamentally impact the lives of all citizens from education to 
healthcare to public safety.  With half of the population underrepresented in many states and 
within party caucuses, women miss opportunities to prepare for higher office and their 
perspectives and experiences are left out of important policy debates.  The absence of these 
 
4 Descriptive representation refers to how well the demographic composition of elected officials mirrors the 
demographic composition of the polity; it can also encompass non-demographic factors like certain life experiences.  
Since women comprise roughly 50% of the population, scholars investigate why females typically do not comprise 
50% of elected representatives in parliament.  This contrasts with studies of substantive representation, which 
investigate how well women’s interests and preferences are represented by elected politicians, regardless of the 
identity or gender composition of the parliament.  Many studies also investigate the connection between descriptive 
and substantive representation to determine whether or not increases in descriptive representation lead to enhanced 
substantive representation of women.  Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work examines these and other conceptions of 





perspectives is problematic because when women are in power they offer innovative policy 
solutions for existing problems and bring attention to social problems that may otherwise be 
ignored (Osborn and Kreitzer 2014; Poggione 2004; Swers 2002, 2005).   
Indeed, several studies have found female representatives to outperform their male 
counterparts in various measures of legislative effectiveness.  For example, Anzia and Berry 
(2011) demonstrate that congresswomen bring more federal dollars home to their districts and 
they sponsor and co-sponsor more legislation than congressmen.  Similarly, for policy areas 
traditionally considered “women’s issues5” (e.g. healthcare, childcare, family leave, gender 
equality) several studies show that women legislators introduce more bills than men and 
facilitate their passage (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Gerrity et al. 2007; Osborn and Kreitzer 
2014)6.  Moreover, regarding constituency service, Thomsen and Sanders (2019) find that female 
state legislators are more responsive to constituent requests than men.  In short, having more 
women in elective office may improve democratic representation and legislative outcomes for 
female and male constituents alike.   
Beyond the American context, the US state legislatures provide an informative set of 
cases for comparative politics research because they challenge some conventional wisdom.  
Perhaps the most robust finding in the comparative politics scholarship on female representation 
is the positive correlation between closed list proportional representation (PR) systems and 
female seat-shares (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, 254-255; McAllister and Studlar 2002, 9; 
Paxton et al. 2010, 43; Reynolds 1999, 568).  Conversely, single member district (SMD) 
plurality electoral systems are found to be negatively correlated with female seat-shares in lower 
 
5 Several studies demonstrate that voters perceive differences in issue expertise and trait ownership between male 
and female politicians, often based on gender stereotypes (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Lawless 2004; Huddy and 
Terkildsen 1993; King and Matland 2003; Dolan 2010). 
6 Cross-national comparative research indicates similar results; see, for example, Bratton and Ray (2002), Kittilson 





houses of national parliaments.  Thus, the cross-national scholarship suggests that legislatures 
with SMD plurality rules are at a disadvantage when it comes to increasing female 
representation, and legislatures with such rules would be expected to have low female seat-
shares.  However, most US state legislatures have SMD plurality electoral rules7, yet they exhibit 
extensive variation with several states approaching gender parity (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4).  
National parliaments of advanced democracies similarly exhibit a wide range of female 
representation, with much of this variation attributed to electoral rules.  This dissertation project 
helps explain variation across US sub-national legislatures while controlling for electoral rules.  
 
Female Representation in the US State Legislatures over Time 
After a period of gradual growth from the 1970’s through the 1990’s, the increase of 
female legislators in state houses virtually stalled for nearly two decades, hovering around 25% 
female-occupied seats across all lower chambers until the past couple of years when another 
period of growth began.  Figure 1.3 illustrates this slow growth since 1981, when 13% of all state 
house seats were held by women. The 2018 elections marked a surge in female representation; 
currently 30% of all state house seats are held by women.   
 
7 Ten states do use some form of multi-member districts (MMD) for electing State House members.  But, it is 
important to note that this system is not similar to closed list proportional representation, and, perhaps more 
importantly, these systems differ in important ways.  For example, Idaho and Washington have seat-designate (aka. 
post) systems, where each state legislative district has two representatives in the house.  After winning a party 
primary, the candidates run for a particular seat, seat A or seat B, in a two-person, Democrat vs. Republican, winner-
take-all race.  These systems function as SMD, first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections, though in most regressions these 
are coded (or possibly mis-coded) as MMD.  Arizona and New Jersey have bloc systems, where each states house 
district has two seats, and voters vote for two candidates; the top two candidates win the seats.  This type of system 
coheres to the standard concept of MMD most closely; but only four states have this system in all state house 
districts.  Other states have a mix of SMD and MMD districts, though in most regression analyses, those states will 
be indicated as MMD.  Richardson and Cooper (2003) provide an especially helpful explanation of the different 
forms of MMD electoral systems across the states, and argue that the concept has been mis-specified in several 
studies leading to faulty conclusions, both regarding minority representation and female representation.  One final 
note is that even in the few states that do use true MMDs, the district magnitude (M) rarely exceeds 2, with some 





Figure 1.3 also shows the partisan breakdown of female representation and makes clear 
that most of the growth in female representation is fueled by the Democratic Party.  In 1981, 
about 6% of all state house seats were held by Republican women and just over 7% were held by 
Democratic women.  In 2019, about 10% of seats are occupied by Republican women, while just 
over 20% are held by female Democratic legislators.   
Female Democratic legislators have continued to occupy a larger share of all house seats 
despite fluctuations in partisan composition of state houses.  For example, after the 2010 election 
cycle the share of all seats held by Democrats dropped from 55% to 47%, but the share of all 
seats held by female Democrats only dropped from about 17% to 15%.  Conversely, the 
Republican Party increased their total seat-share after the 2010 cycle by eight percentage points, 
but the share of total seats held by Republican women only increased by two percentage points.  
Thus, even when Republicans have won more seats overall, those seats have mostly gone to male 
legislators.  This observation emphasizes the need to consider the Democratic and Republican 
caucuses separately (see Figure 1.4).  The Democratic Party has consistently increased female 
representation within its caucuses despite fluctuations in the Party’s overall success.  As seen in 
Figure 1.4, in 2000 female legislators comprised 28% of all Democratic seats, while in 2019 they 
occupy 44%.  In stark contrast, Republican Party caucuses have stagnated with respect to female 
representation.  In 2000, female legislators comprised 21% of all Republican-held seats, while 











































































































































































Figure 1.3 - Female Representation in State Houses by Party
1981 – 2019, All States




























































































Figure 1.4 - Female Representation within Party Caucuses 
2000 - 2019, All States







The cross-state variation we observe has also persisted, with some states consistently 
performing better or worse than others.  This is demonstrated in Figure 1.5 with a selection of 
states representing a wide range of female representation over time.  For example, the female 
seat-share in the Louisiana State House has increased from 3% in 1981 to 16% in 2019, but it is 
low compared to other states.  Female representation in Nevada, on the other hand, increased 
from 13% to 55% over that time, with a marked increase after the 2018 election cycle.  Nevada 
achieved gender parity because both major party caucuses in the state perform better than 
average as seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  Over the past five years in the Nevada State House, 
female representation within the Democratic caucus has averaged 55% and averaged 30% within 
































































































































































Figure 1.5 –Variation in Female Representation, 1981 – 2019, Selected States





32%, respectively; this state also achieved gender parity in its lower chamber after the 2018 
elections. 
 
Explaining Gender Disparities in Political Office 
Why do men continue to outnumber women in elective political office across the US?  
One key empirical observation is that current female underrepresentation is not necessarily 
driven by overt voter discrimination against women8; instead, a shortage of female candidates is 
more likely to blame (Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010).  Despite the evidence that “when women 
run, women win9” (Smith and Fox 2001), women just do not run for office as frequently as men.  
Why not? 
Existing explanations fall into three categories: (1) behavioral and rational choice; (2) 
institutional; (3) structural and cultural.  Behavioral and rational choice approaches typically 
focus on individual-level attributes related to potential candidates such as political ambition 
(Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010), ideology (Thomsen 2015), or election aversion (Kanthak and 
Woon 2015).  While these micro-level theories are useful for identifying why women on average 
are less likely to run for office compared to men, these approaches are less helpful for explaining 
cross-state and intraparty variation.  To this end, macro-level explanations in the latter two 
categories are more effective by leveraging differences in political institutions, electoral rules, 
and socio-economic factors to determine why some state legislatures are approaching gender 
parity and others lag far behind.  Many female representation scholars also adopt a supply and 
 
8 However, it is important to note that anticipated discrimination may deter qualified women from seeking office as 
Anzia and Berry (2011) suggest. 
9 While “when women run, women win” is somewhat of a rallying cry for advocates of increased female 
representation, more recent research demonstrates that electoral outcomes are not completely gender neutral.  For 
example, experimental work by Mo (2015) suggests that gender bias is likely to affect vote choice for some voters, 
while Fulton (2012) and Pearson and McGhee (2013) demonstrate that to achieve comparable electoral success to 





demand model for organizing relevant factors (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Kenworthy and 
Malami 1999; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Paxton, et al. 2010; Reynolds 1999; Rosenbluth et 
al. 2006).  Supply-side factors relate to the pipeline of female candidates, while demand-side 
factors address characteristics of societies and electoral systems that may inhibit or encourage 
the election of female candidates.   
Behavioral and rational choice theories have identified important micro-level factors that 
explain why women on average are less likely to run for office than men.  Scholarship in this 
vein tends to emphasize supply-side factors.  In their pioneering study, Lawless and Fox (2005, 
2010) demonstrate that qualified women exhibit lower levels of political ambition compared to 
similarly situated men.  The authors critique previous research about why citizens run for office; 
much of this early work centered on the concept of the political opportunity structure, which 
measured political factors within an electorate such as chance of winning, strength of opponent, 
partisan composition of constituency, party congruence with constituents, etc. (see Schlesinger 
1966).  If a potential candidate evaluates these factors and they represent a favorable situation, 
then he would throw his hat in the ring.  Lawless and Fox (2005, 2010) challenge this model 
because it treats male and female potential candidates and their individual calculations alike.  
Instead, through their survey data, the authors found systematic differences between males’ and 
females’ self-assessments.  Between similarly skilled and credentialed men and women, women 
consistently discounted their skills and abilities and gave themselves lower values on their 
perceived readiness to run for office.   
This gender gap in political ambition is the oft-cited and emphasized finding; however, 
Lawless and Fox (2010, 97-105) also demonstrate a gender gap in candidate recruitment; women 





candidate emergence.  Regardless of gender, the likelihood for anyone to run for office is very 
low and recruitment by political actors (i.e. party officials, elected officials, interest groups 
leaders, community group leaders) greatly increases one’s likelihood of running for office 
(Lawless and Fox 2010, 109).  While this is true for both male and female potential candidates, if 
females are recruited less often, fewer females will run for office.  The theory of gendered civil 
society context offered in this dissertation projects sheds additional light on why this gender gap 
in political recruitment exists and why it may be more pervasive in certain places. 
Other micro-level research focuses on factors like political ideology and personal 
circumstances.  Thomsen (2015) shows that ideological moderation among Republican women 
in particular has contributed to the stagnation of female representation in Congress on the right.  
Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) demonstrate that concerns about privacy, family obligations, 
and fundraising are more intense for female state legislators compared to their male counterparts.  
Indeed, these concerns are valid; Jenkins (2007) finds that women running for state legislatures 
must devote more time and effort to fundraising to achieve the same totals as men.  These studies 
provide important insight into the unique challenges that female candidates face and tell us why 
the pool of potential female candidates is likely to be smaller on average compared to the male 
pool. However, in general, these approaches cannot necessarily tell us why women are 
apparently able to overcome these challenges in certain places, but not in others. 
To explain variation in female representation, scholars leverage differences in macro-
level factors across states in American politics and across countries in the comparative 
scholarship.  The role of political parties in either impeding or advancing female representation 
has garnered much attention in both subfields.  Some influential explanations in cross-national 





state legislatures.  Still, some important insights can be gleaned from the comparative work, and 
these are relevant to the theory underpinning this dissertation.   
As noted previously, one of the most prevalent findings in the CP scholarship on female 
representation is the positive correlation between closed list PR systems and female seat-shares 
in lower houses of national parliaments (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999, 254-255; McAllister and 
Studlar 2002, 9; Paxton et al. 2010, 43; Reynolds 1999, 568).  Attempts to explain the causal 
connection between electoral rules and female representation typically focus on the role of 
political parties (Caul 1999; Kenny and Verge 2012; Krook 2006; Hughes 2011).  In the closed-
list PR context, parties typically control candidate nomination; thus, party organizations have the 
capacity to promote female candidacies if they want to either by actively recruiting female 
candidates or by implementing voluntary candidate gender quotas, for instance.  In places where 
parties have less control over candidate nomination, they have less capacity to promote female 
candidacies even if the party wants to do so.  Therefore, my interpretation of the comparative 
literature points to the interaction between parties and the broader electoral system as important 
to understanding the correlation, rather than the electoral system per se (see Thames and 
Williams 2010; Valdini 2013).  As will be discussed in the next chapter, this idea of the 
interaction between party behavior and broader contextual factors is a key element of the theory 
developed in this project. 
In the American politics research, institutional factors of interest include term limits, 
legislative professionalism, multi-member districts, public campaign finance options, and, of 
course, political parties (Norrander and Wilcox 2014).  Term limits were thought to enable 
female candidates to overcome the incumbency advantage that sitting male legislators 





turnover created by term limits does not necessarily increase female representation because of 
the limited pipeline of willing female candidates, particularly on the Republican side (O’Regan 
and Stambough 2017).  Legislative professionalism captures how lucrative and prestigious a 
state legislator position is (Squire 2007).  The more professionalized the legislature, the more 
competitive the elections, which would disadvantage women, who are more hesitant to run to 
begin with.  However, despite the party-neutral nature of this theory, the variable has been shown 
to have differential effects by party (Norrander and Wilcox 2014).  Sanbonmatsu (2002, 801-
802) found lower levels of legislative professionalism to be positively associated with rates of 
female Republican officeholders, but legislative professionalism was unrelated to levels of 
Democratic women in office.  The same can be said for multi-member districts (MMD) and 
public campaign finance options, both of which are expected to have positive effects on female 
representation, yet the effects appear to differ between the two major parties (Norrander and 
Wilcox 2014).   
Looking at the MMD variable more closely, some American politics scholars have found 
evidence that states with multi-member districts tend to have higher levels of female 
representation (Norrander and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016).  The theory behind this is 
that when voters are choosing multiple candidates, they are more likely to consider the gender 
balance of their choices10.  However, I contend that this measure is a bit problematic.  The 
existence of multi-member state legislative districts has declined precipitously since the 1970's, 
during the same period we observed the most growth in female state legislators.  Also, Norrander 
and Wilcox (2014) examine change in female representation between 1993 and 2011, and they 
found that eliminating MMDs was not statistically related to the dependent variable (Norrander 
 
10 In contrast, Crowder-Meyer et al. (2015) find that female candidates in local city council elections fare better in 





and Wilcox 2014, 281).  Also, the mechanisms are somewhat questionable since most MMDs in 
the American states have district magnitudes of two, which does not allow for much flexibility in 
balancing vote choice or candidate support, especially if voters would have to cross party lines to 
do so.  Furthermore, there are coding problems - some states, like Idaho and Washington, use 
seat-designate or post MMDs that function more similarly to SMD first-past-the-post systems, 
while others, like Maryland, only have a portion of districts that are MMD.   
In terms of campaign finance, research has found that states with publicly funded 
campaigns tend to have higher levels of female representation (Norrander and Wilcox 2014, 
283).  Also, while studies find that women are not necessarily at a fundraising disadvantage 
compared to men, female candidates often have to use non-traditional fundraising schemes, or 
work harder and longer to achieve the same final totals (Jenkins 2007; Lawless and Fox 2010, 
27-28; Thomas 2014, 9).  Survey data also suggest that female candidates are more concerned 
about fundraising compared to males (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). 
Clearly party organizations are important political institutions that affect the process of 
candidate emergence.  Recruitment by political parties, and by affiliated groups in civil society, 
is identified in multiple studies as important in determining whether any citizen would decide to 
run for office regardless of gender (Lawless and Fox 2010; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013).  But 
when the effect of parties and party strength on female representation has been studied in the 
American context, results have been mixed.  Sanbonmatsu (2002, 801-802) found that states with 
stronger, traditional party organizations tend to have lower levels of female representation, while 
Norrander and Wilcox (2014, 283) found no effect for the Traditional Party Structure variable. In 
another study, Sanbonmatsu (2006) surveyed state and legislative party leaders and found that 





local party leaders in the US and finds that the networks that these leaders tap into for 
recruitment, as well as the gender of local party leaders, affects the likelihood that female 
candidates will be recruited.   
Despite the plethora of research, we still lack a comprehensive theory about the 
relationship between party operations and female candidate emergence; in fact, most research 
assumes a direct relationship, but the hypothesized direction of the effect is mixed across studies.  
Hypotheses leaning on the comparative work tend to assume that stronger parties lead to more 
female representation (because PR systems typically have strong parties), but other work – more 
common in American politics research -- posits a negative relationship, assuming that 
historically male-dominated party organizations inhibit female representation.  The theory 
offered in this dissertation posits that the predicted effects of party organizations can only be 
understood in conjunction with broader contextual factors. 
Structural and cultural variables also explain some of the variation in female 
representation across legislatures.  Public attitudes toward gender equality and women in 
leadership (Norris and Inglehart 2001), in addition to socioeconomic factors such as female labor 
force participation and female educational attainment fall into this category.  In general, the 
literature would suggest that the more left-leaning a state – in terms of either liberal ideology or 
Democratic partisanship -- the higher its predicted level of female representation11.  This is based 
on the gender gap in American politics, which shows that for the past several decades women 
have affiliated with the Democratic party at higher rates than men (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 
 
11 The Democratic Party has higher rates of female representation than the Republican Party in the US (see CAWP 
2019 and Figures 1.1 through 1.4).  Left leaning parties also tend to outperform parties on the right cross-nationally 





2004; Carroll and Fox 2014; Huddy et. al. 2008; Osborn and Kreitzer 2014; Pogionne 2004; 
Whitaker 2008)12.   
Lawless and Fox (2010) and Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) identify another 
mechanism at work in favor of the Democratic Party.  The authors found that being contacted by 
a political activist or interest group or being affiliated with a women’s interest group increased 
the likelihood that a woman would run for or hold a political office.  Since women’s interest 
groups are disproportionately liberal and endorse Democratic candidates, this may explain the 
rise in Democratic female politicians, compared to the stagnation of Republican females in 
office.  More recently, Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman (2018) provide further evidence that 
groups advocating specifically for increased female representation, or “women’s representation 
policy demanders13” as the authors term them, are more fully integrated into the Democratic 
Party coalition than into that of the Republican Party.  These factors all suggest that the 
Democratic Party would outperform the Republican Party in terms of female representation, but 
they do not shed light on why we observe so much intraparty variation.  This dissertation aims to 
contribute in this area. 
Political culture is another structural variable of interest.  Many scholars have tested the 
relationship between Elazar’s (1984) state-level political culture measures and female 
representation.  He classified states according to three political cultures -- traditional, moralistic, 
and individualistic -- based on the dominant perceptions of politics and political operations in the 
states (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). In “traditional political culture” states, largely found in the 
 
12 Much scholarship is focused on the sources of the gender gap.  Some research points to the rightward partisan 
shift of American men over the last three decades as the main driver of the gap (Kauffman and Petrocik 1999; 
Gillion et al. 2020).  Other work focuses on socioeconomic transformations such as rising divorce rates and 
increased labor force participation of women (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). 
13 Some of these interest groups include: The White House Project, Women’s Campaign Forum, Emerge America, 





South, politics is seen as defending "traditional values", with important implications for gender 
and race issues.  Thus, traditional political culture would be unfavorable to female 
representation.  In “moralistic political culture” states, politics is seen as serving the "public 
interest" and broad political participation is emphasized.  This culture is expected to be more 
favorable to female representation.  “Individualistic” cultures are characterized by elite-driven 
politics that serve particularistic interests and have more traditional party machines.  The closed 
nature of politics in this context is thought to be unfavorable to female representation. 
Scholars employ a few composite measures to capture structural macro-level factors such 
as the “women friendly districts” (WFD) and the social eligibility pool indices (Palmer and 
Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Sanbonmatsu 2002). The social eligibility pool captures the 
level and nature of female labor force participation; the more highly educated and professional 
women in a state, the larger the pool of potential candidates, so a positive effect on female 
representation is expected.  The WFD index includes factors such as urbanization, ethnic and 
racial diversity, rates of higher education and income, blue collar workforce, and district size.  
Using these broad socioeconomic factors, they aim to estimate the pools of potential female 
candidates and how these pools vary across space.  
Adapted from Palmer and Simon’s (2008) study of female representation in Congress, 
Pyeatt and Yanus (2016) apply the WFD concept to female representation in state legislatures.  
They find that the index has a positive and substantive effect on both the emergence and success 
of female candidates.  This suggests that elements of the index are positively associated with 
female representation including, urbanization, diversity, rates of higher education and income, 
while others are negatively associated, such as Republican partisanship, conservatism, blue collar 





included in the index are unclear.  It is possible that this factor captures how left-leaning districts 
are and reflects the longstanding gender gap in the US mentioned previously, in which women 
affiliate with the Democratic Party at higher rates than men.  We would expect to find more 
female politicians in more Democratic places, but the intraparty variation shown in Figures 1.1 
and 1.2 illustrates that the path to office for Democratic women is more challenging in some 
places compared to others. 
By building upon existing research, my theory offers an explanation of female candidate 
emergence that accounts for stakeholder groups in civil society and the strategic behavior of 
parties within local political contexts.  In doing so, this theory addresses three areas of the extant 
literature that would benefit from additional development.   
First, the broader structural factors (i.e. WFD, social eligibility pool) that have been 
developed are too broad and provide limited insight into the actual causal mechanisms at work 
behind them.  They tend to capture Democratic partisanship and fail to explain intraparty 
variation across the states. For example, consider the correlations between the states’ average 
WFD measure (Pyeatt and Yanus 2016) and partisan composition of the legislatures.  The 
percent of house seats held by Democrats is highly correlated with a state’s average WFD value, 
suggesting that the WFD measure captures general Democratic partisanship rather than 
something specific to female representation (Figure 1.6).  In fact, female representation within 
Democratic caucuses does not appear to correlate with average WFD values by state (Figure 1.7) 
nor with the partisan composition of legislatures (see Figure 1.1).  The correlation between 
average WFD scores and female representation in Democratic caucuses is weak and not 
statistically significant.  If we want to understand party-level female representation, then this is 
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Second, while research of political parties has been instrumental in identifying some 
causal mechanisms related to candidate recruitment, I contend that we need better theory about 
how exactly contextual factors shape incentives for parties when it comes to female candidate 
emergence.  Third, interest groups and other civil society actors are important stakeholders in the 
candidate emergence context, yet such groups have received minimal attention in the female 
representation literature, aside from women’s movement groups and “women’s representation 
policy demanders” (i.e. EMILY’s List, Emerge America).   
These three areas of the literature that are in need of development are interrelated.  I 
argue that contextual factors affect the likelihood that certain types of candidates will emerge in 
general, and moreover, they create candidate selection incentives for political parties.  We need a 
better understanding of the candidate emergence context that accounts for an array of stakeholder 
groups in civil society, and the strategic behavior of parties within that context, in order to more 
fully understand the lack of gender balance in political representation.  The theory of gendered 
civil society context contributes to this effort. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
As explained in the previous section, existing scholarship shows that the process of 
female candidate emergence is dependent upon structural and institutional factors (Norrander 
and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Hogan 2001).  Yet, the structural factors, which 
estimate pools of potential candidates, are often too broad and do not differentiate by party, as is 
the case with the “women friendly districts” concept (Palmer and Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 
2016). To capture a narrower pool of potential political candidates relevant to a given party 





Among other things, parties rely on their allied groups in civil society for candidate recruitment.  
Civil society groups include unions, business and professional associations, civic and community 
groups, and advocacy and interest groups.  The gender balance of these groups affects the 
likelihood of potential candidates being male or female.  I hypothesize that when a party’s local 
gendered civil society context is comprised of female-dominated networks, associated candidate 
pipelines are also more female-dominated, and so the emergence of female candidates is more 
likely compared to female candidate emergence in places where male-dominated networks wield 
more political power.   
Chapter 2 also outlines the second main guiding hypothesis of the project, which explores 
the moderating effect of party strength on the relationship between the gendered civil society 
context and the likelihood of female candidates.  Again, party strength is used specifically to 
refer to the amount of local party control over candidate nomination.  Some research assumes a 
direct relationship between party strength and female representation (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 2006; 
Thames and Williams 2010).  Instead, I argue that its effect is context-specific as some cross-
national research suggests (Valdini 2013; Krook 2010a).  High party strength implies more 
capacity of a party to influence candidate nomination, but just because a party has that capacity 
does not mean that it would necessarily use it to promote female candidacies.  Not all parties 
want to, or have incentives to, increase female representation within their ranks.  For instance, 
some parties promote gender equity, while others support traditional gender roles (Krook 2010b, 
165).  Therefore, we must consider the context within which parties operate and determine 
whether or not that context creates incentives to recruit and nominate female candidates.  I 
hypothesize that when the gendered civil society context is favorable for female candidate 





between context and party strength effects the emergence of female candidates, but party 
strength itself is not expected to have an independent effect. 
I employ a multi-method approach to test my theory of female candidate emergence.  
Chapters 3 and 4 present the quantitative tests of the two main hypotheses, respectively.  First, I 
create an original dataset including measures of gendered civil society context and party strength 
as well as other control variables derived from the literature.  I use regression analysis to test (1) 
if the gendered civil society context is associated with female candidate emergence, and (2) if 
that relationship is moderated by party strength.   
Qualitative analysis, based on interviews with county party leaders across Georgia and 
New York, is presented in Chapter 5 and serves two crucial purposes.  First, qualitative case 
studies enable me to assess whether the concept of gendered civil society context is meaningful 
in the real political world.  Second, interviews with party leaders allow me to examine the 
interactions between local party organizations and civil society networks at a deeper level, 
thereby illuminating causal mechanisms at work in the process of female candidate emergence.  
Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings of the project, discussing its broader 








The Theory of Gendered Civil Society Context and Local Party Strength 
 
Introduction 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the theory tested in this dissertation has two main parts.  First, I 
develop the concept of gendered civil society context, which I predict to have a direct effect on 
the likelihood of female candidate emergence.  Second, the expected effect of party strength is 
clarified.  Rather than having a direct effect on female candidate emergence, as has been 
suggested in many studies, party strength is expected to moderate the relationship between 
gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  This relationship is predicted to 
be stronger at higher levels of party strength.   
 Figure 2.1 illustrates the components of the causal model.  The main dependent variable 
is the likelihood of a female candidate running for a given party in a given legislative district.  
The two main independent variables of theoretical interest are gendered civil society context and 
party strength.  I expect a direct causal relationship between the gendered civil society context 
and the likelihood of female candidates.  I expect this relationship to be moderated by the degree 
of party strength.  The specific hypotheses derived from the theory are explained further in the 
following sections. 






While the existing research described in Chapter 1 is helpful in identifying broad socio-
economic factors that correlate with female representation, I argue that we need a more precise 
conception of the candidate emergence context that is more expressly political.  The concept of 
gendered civil society context fills this gap by systematically measuring the relative political 
influence of relevant stakeholder networks within a local party’s strategic environment and 
combining that with information about the gendered composition of these networks.  Essentially, 
it narrows the pool of potential candidates to include individuals tied to networks that are 
engaged in local politics, and indicates the gender balance, or lack thereof, of these networks.  
Where the gendered civil society context is more female-dominated, female candidates are more 
likely to emerge as compared to more male-dominated contexts.  Since many groups in civil 
society are affiliated with industries and professions, I use data on industrial and occupational 
segregation by sex to estimate the gender composition of these groups. 
It is important to note that the gendered civil society context is measured at the district-
party level or the state-party level, rather than the district or state level.  This unit of analysis 
acknowledges the fact that two parties operating in the same geographic area are responding to 
different stakeholders and thus have different gendered civil society contexts. For instance, a 
teachers union is more likely to be influential within the Democratic Party in a given district, 
while the local Chamber of Commerce may be a more influential player within the Republican 
Party in the same district. 
The gendered civil society context sets the stage for the strategic behavior of political 
parties.  While the first part of the theory focuses on the socio-political context from which 
candidates emerge, the second part focuses on the capacity of party organizations to affect 





female-affiliated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to nominate female 
candidates tied to these networks.  Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination, 
this effect is expected to be greater.   
Operationalizing party strength at the local level across the US is somewhat challenging.  
In some electoral systems abroad, party officials choose candidates and voters vote for parties 
rather than for specific candidates; this represents the highest level of party strength, where a 
party has high capacity to act on its candidate selection incentives.  As a whole, the US is on the 
lower end of the party strength spectrum because in most places voters select party nominees 
through primary elections, leaving local party organizations with limited capacity to act on 
candidate selection incentives.  However, while the formal rules governing candidate selection 
are fairly uniform – primary elections – there is indeed some variation in informal practices at 
the state and local party levels (Sanbonmatsu 2006).   For example, in her survey of state and 
legislative party leaders, Sanbonmatsu (2006) found variation in the extent to which state parties 
engaged in informal gate-keeping activities like discouraging primary challengers to incumbents 
or endorsing a particular candidate during a primary campaign.  Thus, the challenge is coming up 
with a measure of local-level party strength that captures both formal and informal modes of 
control over candidate nomination.  Unfortunately, such a measure is not available at the state 
legislative district level.  Therefore, I use two measures of party strength common in the 
literature – one from Mayhew (1986) and the other from Cotter et al. (1984).  The Cotter 
measure of average strength of local party organizations is measured at the state-party level 
making it a better fit for the analysis than Mayhew’s traditional party structure variable, which is 
measured at the state level.  However, neither measure is ideal because they are quite dated and 





Once I have defined and measured both the incentive structure and the capacity of parties 
to act upon such incentives, then I can ascertain the implications for female candidate 




H1 – Gendered Civil Society Context Hypotheses 
 Tests of this set of hypotheses will evaluate three main claims:  (1) the civil society 
context is gendered for both major parties; (2) the gendered civil society context differs between 
the two parties, and it is more favorable to female candidate emergence in the Democratic Party; 
and (3) the gendered civil society context has a direct effect on female candidate emergence for 
both parties. 
 
H1a:  The gendered civil society context is more male-dominated than female-dominated for 
both the Democratic and Republican parties. 
  
Hypothesis H1a posits that male-dominated groups will have more relative political 
power compared to female-dominated groups, within both major parties.  This prediction is in 
line with previous research that indicates political networks and recruitment tend to be controlled 
by men across the political spectrum (Crowder-Meyer 2013, Lawless and Fox 2010, 
Sanbonmatsu 2006, and others).  Also, basic knowledge of occupational segregation by sex 





dominated ones, as females are concentrated in fewer industries and sectors (i.e. education, 
health) (Cohen 2013).  
 
H1b:  Female-dominated groups will have more relative influence within the Democratic Party’s 
gendered civil society context compared to the relative influence of female-dominated groups 
within the Republican Party’s gendered civil society context. 
 This hypothesis suggests that the gendered civil society context will be more favorable to 
female candidate emergence for the Democratic Party than for the Republican Party.  This is 
derived from a few differences between the parties.  First, the Democratic Party tends to embrace 
“women’s issues” within its policy platforms more overtly than the Republican Party.  Second, 
issues tied to occupations in which women are highly concentrated such as education and 
healthcare also tend to be high-priority issues for the Democratic Party, and groups associated 
with those sectors tend to be more aligned with the left of the political spectrum14.  For example, 
teachers unions and nursing unions tend to align with the Democratic Party in most states.  
Finally, women’s groups and groups that specifically advocate for increases in female 
representation are much more common within the Democratic Party’s strategic context as 
compared to the Republican Party’s.  Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman (2018) show that 
“women’s representation policy demanders,” such as EMILY’s List, are important stakeholders 
within the Democratic Party coalition, but not within that of the Republican Party. 
 
H1c:  Higher relative influence of female-dominated networks in gendered civil society context 
→ Higher likelihood of female candidates 
 
14 Bradley Jones, “Republicans and Democrats have grown further apart on what the nation’s top priorities should 





Figure 2.2 - Illustration of Hypothesis H1c 
 
 
H1d:  Higher relative influence of male-dominated networks in gendered civil society context → 
Lower likelihood of female candidates 
 






Hypotheses H1c and H1d, illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, examine the relationship 
between the political influence of civil society actors and the types of candidates that run for 
office.  Social and political networks are important to candidate emergence generally, and appear 
to be especially important to female candidate emergence in particular (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 
2013).  These networks may lack gender balance due to a variety of factors.  For instance, the 
gender balance of membership in professional associations or labor unions may be skewed due to 
occupational segregation by sex across professions.  Data reveal that the professional and civic 
group backgrounds of state legislators are indeed different for male and female legislators 
(Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013).  For example, a higher proportion of female legislators 
compared to males come from the fields of education and health -- fields where women 
outnumber men (Cohen 2013).  And so, H1c posits that the presence of female candidates is 
more likely in districts where networks affiliated with female-dominated industries and civic 
groups are more prevalent and politically relevant in relation to other networks – in other words, 
where the gendered civil society context is more female-dominated.  The corollary is tested in 
H1d, which posits that the presence of female candidates is less likely in districts where networks 
affiliated with male-dominated industries and civic groups are more prevalent and politically 
relevant in relation to other networks – in other words, where the gendered civil society context 
is more male-dominated.  As will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, measures of female-
dominated and male-dominated GCSC are not necessarily mirror images of each other because 
there is a third “gender-balanced” GCSC category.     
 I propose that there is a positive relationship between the relative political influence of 
female-background civil society actors and the likelihood of female candidates for a few reasons.  





leaders of these groups are likely to be female.  Civil society groups promote and support 
candidates whom they know and can trust to pursue their preferred legislative agendas once in 
office.  Second, political parties will pull candidates from these allied groups.  Parties rely on 
civil society groups for various resources including candidate recruitment.  When searching for 
candidates, local party leaders will tap into their allied civil society networks to identify potential 
recruits.    
It is important to emphasize the idea of relative strength of civil society actors.  While 
women’s groups like EMILY’s List or Emerge America are surely important actors for 
promoting female candidate emergence, these types of groups do not operate in a vacuum.  
Indeed, many other groups in society also have stakes in promoting particular types of candidates 
with certain group ties or occupational backgrounds.  Some groups, like EMILY’s List, may 
benefit women directly because these “women’s representation policy demanders” specifically 
advocate for the issue of increasing female representation (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 
2018).   Other politically relevant groups may lead to increases in female representation 
indirectly due to occupational segregation by sex.  Such groups include teachers unions and 
nursing unions, whose memberships are female-dominated because women are over-represented 
in these fields.  If parties tap groups like these for candidate recruitment, then there is a higher 
likelihood that female candidates would emerge from these female-dominated pools of potential 
candidates.  Similarly, other civil society groups may be disadvantageous to potential female 
candidates because these pipelines of candidates may skew male.  For example, trade unions or 
farming associations with political clout in certain areas would likely promote candidates with 
ties to their more male-dominated networks.  So, while the presence and activity of women’s 





assessed along with countervailing forces within the strategic political context within which 
parties act.  This is what the concept of gendered civil society context captures. 
For the quantitative tests of hypotheses H1a through H1d, I create a dataset using 
campaign fundraising data coupled with data on industrial segregation by sex to measure the 
gendered civil society context (GCSC).  The GCSC variables capture the relative political 
influence of female-dominated and male-dominated civil society actors at the district-party level 
for US state legislative districts (lower chambers) and at the state-party level.  The percentage of 
contributions to candidates from three groups of actors – female-dominated groups, male-
dominated groups, and gender-balanced groups -- are the independent variables of interest.  In 
Chapter 3, I construct empirical measures of the gendered civil society context (GCSC) and 
present quantitative tests of the first set of hypotheses, H1a through H1d.  Then, I employ 
logistic and linear regression to test for a statistical association between GCSC and female 
candidate emergence at the state legislative district and state levels.   
The Follow the Money (FTM) database of the National Institute on Money in Politics 
includes detailed records of contributions to all state-level political candidates for several recent 
election cycles.  Contributors are classified according to multiple factors including industry-
affiliation and type of interest group.  I use information from the tables on occupational 
segregation by sex from the American Community Survey (ACS) of the Census Bureau to 
identify female-dominated and male-dominated contributors.  These are groups affiliated with 
industries in which the workforce is comprised of over 60% women or men, respectively.  
Candidate gender information is obtained from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 





Using contribution data has strengths, but also some clear weaknesses mostly related to 
concerns about endogeneity.  In terms of strengths, these data provide information about political 
activity of groups in relation to each other.  So, if contributors affiliated with Group A give 
$500,000 to a Democratic candidate in District 1, while Group B gives $10,000, Group A 
appears to be more politically active and influential within the Democratic Party in the district as 
compared to Group B.  Of course, this is not a perfect measure of influence because, as noted, 
civil society groups provide myriad resources to political parties aside from campaign 
contributions.  Still, this measure allows me to use uniform data, which is available for all state 
legislative districts across the US.  Measuring simply the presence of groups in given districts 
would not provide information about the relative political influence of these groups.  Asking 
party leaders about their allied groups would be more difficult to collect at the district level for 
the entire country, though this is useful in the context of small-n analysis.  Also, this contribution 
data approach allows me to observe changes in the gendered civil society context over time.  
Thus while not flawless, for the quantitative portion of the project, contribution data can provide 
a decent proxy measure for the concept that I aim to capture, namely, the relative influence of 
civil society actors, and their gendered nature, by party for all districts across the US. 
Another potential problem with this approach is that the presence of a female candidate 
may lead to more contributions from female-dominated networks, so the direction of causality is 
in question.  However, previous research strongly suggests that female candidate emergence 
especially is a highly relational process.  Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013, 45) explain their 
theory of “relationally embedded candidacy” whereby “the candidacy decision-making process 
takes place in the context of a network of relationships and is deeply influenced by relational 





resources. Instead, their emergence as candidates is related to, and often contingent upon, their 
involvement in relevant networks. 
I complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis, which allows me to 
validate the measure of gendered civil society context and gain deeper insight into how it affects 
the candidate emergence process in two cases – Georgia and New York.  In Chapter 5, through 
interviews with local party officials, I examine the political implications of local gendered civil 
society contexts.  These interviews also contribute to the second set of hypotheses focused on 
party strength, described next. 
 
H2 - Party Strength Interaction Hypotheses 
H2a:  The positive effect of a more female-dominated gendered civil society context on female 
candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases 
 






H2b:  The negative effect of a more male-dominated gendered civil society context on female 
candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases 
 
Figure 2.5 - Illustration of Hypothesis H2b 
 
 
This set of hypotheses – H2a and H2b -- addresses the posited moderating effect of party 
strength on the relationship between gendered civil society context and female candidate 
emergence.  While the previous hypotheses focus on the socio-political context from which 
candidates emerge, this hypothesis focuses on the capacity of party organizations to affect 
processes of candidate nomination within that context.  A gendered civil society context in which 
female-dominated networks are more powerful creates incentives for a party to nominate female 
candidates tied to these networks.  Where parties exert more control over candidate nomination, 
this effect is expected to be greater.  Conversely, a gendered civil society context in which male-





to these networks, who are more likely to be men.  Where parties exert more control over 
candidate nomination, this effect is expected to be greater. 
Assumptions about the role of political parties and female representation need additional 
clarification.  As noted in the literature review presented in Chapter 1, there are some mixed 
findings regarding the effect of party strength on female representation.  Some scholars have 
inferred a direct positive relationship between party strength and female representation because 
parties tend to have more control over candidate selection in proportional representation (PR) 
systems, and because PR rules are highly correlated with female representation (Thames and 
Williams 2010).  Other scholars have looked into broader contextual factors – like social 
attitudes toward traditional gender roles – and found that party strength matters in only certain 
settings, but since the factors are so broad, the causal mechanisms are not always clear (Valdini 
2013).  Still other scholars have delved into party organizations and operations and found certain 
factors tend to correlate with female representation such as the level of party organization 
decentralization (Kenny and Verge 2012) or the number of party leaders who are female 
(Crowder-Meyer 2013).   
All of these findings are valid, yet seem to be theoretically disparate.  I think they can be 
consolidated into a causal path that can be applied across electoral systems.  My theory starts 
with the assumption that parties respond strategically to their political environment.  When 
thinking about candidate selection, we can derive a set of incentives from the context within 
which parties operate.  From these incentives we can identify how they may affect the gender 
balance of potential pools of candidates.  The concept of gendered civil society context 





candidate emergence.  It identifies whether local stakeholder groups are comprised of mostly 
male- or female-dominated networks, and how these networks relate to candidate pipelines.   
Once candidate selection incentives are identified by assessing the gendered civil society 
context, we can consider the capacity of party organizations to act on those incentives.  In 
electoral systems where party officials choose candidates and voters vote for parties rather than 
for specific candidates (high party strength), a party has high capacity to act on its incentives.  
Where voters select party nominees through primary elections and there are few barriers to 
primary ballot access (low party strength), the capacity of local parties to act on candidate 
selection incentives is much more limited.  Once we have defined both the incentive structure 
and the capacity of parties to act upon such incentives, then we can ascertain the implications for 
female candidate emergence.   
Without knowing their incentives, the capacity of parties to influence candidate 
nomination does not necessarily tell us what we should expect regarding female candidate 
emergence.  If the incentive structure is defined too broadly, it is difficult to trace the causal 
mechanisms between context and candidate emergence.  Therefore, we need to be able to 
identify a more specific and politically relevant candidate emergence context and then determine 
the capacity of parties to influence candidate selection within that context.  From the existing 
literature, it appears that the effect of party strength on female representation should indeed be 
contingent upon broader incentive contexts, though this is not always recognized.  Take the 
example of Sweden.  Swedish parties adopted candidate gender quotas and zipper lists15 in 
response to a change in their strategic environment; influential stakeholders were demanding 
more gender balance in representation (Krook 2010c, 714-716).  The parties had the capacity to 
adopt these tools because of the Swedish electoral rules.  If Sweden was less party-centered, then 
 





parties may not have had the capacity to act upon their change in incentives and implement these 
tools to increase female candidacies.  The important point is that the capacity was there all along; 
it took a change in incentives to actually use the capacity to promote female representation. 
For the quantitative test of hypotheses H2a and H2b, I will include a party strength 
variable in the regression models in addition to an interaction term – gendered civil society 
context * party strength.  I expect the interaction term to be significant, while the party strength 
variable alone is not expected to be significant.  As noted previously, many aspects of party 
strength within the US electoral context are informal.  For instance, does the local party 
organization endorse candidates and provide resources to favored candidates in primary 
elections, or does the local party remain neutral?  Do local party leaders attempt to avoid primary 
elections altogether by negotiating with potential candidates behind the scenes?  To what extent 
do local party organizations collaborate with the state party organization when it comes to 
candidate recruitment?  Identifying how, and the extent to which, local parties exert control over 
candidate nomination is crucial to understanding how effectively stakeholders in civil society are 
able to promote candidates.  Unfortunately, this level of party strength detail is not available at 
the local level for all state legislative districts.  Therefore, for the quantitative tests of these 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, I use the two party strength variables from Mayhew and 







The Gendered Civil Society Context and Female Candidate Emergence 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 describes the existing research on female representation and demonstrates the 
key takeaways. One prominent finding is that “when women run, women win.”  In other words, 
women’s underrepresentation is not necessarily caused by voters rejecting female candidates at 
the ballot box; instead, it is because women run for office much less than men.  By ruling out 
overt voter discrimination against female candidates, researchers seek to identify why women are 
less likely to consider electoral politics in the first place.  Some of this difference is attributed to 
another key finding in the literature – the gender gap in political ambition (Lawless and Fox 
2005, 2010).  In other words, survey data indicate that similarly situated men and women express 
different levels of interest in running for elective political office.  Ongoing research is geared 
toward explaining this gap based on gendered socialization effects, anticipated gender-based 
discrimination, gender gaps in ideological positioning, election and competition aversion, and 
other individual-level factors that may vary, on average, between men and women. 
However, the descriptive analysis presented in Chapter 1 also highlights something that 
many studies tend to overlook – women appear to have overcome the political ambition gender 
gap in some state legislature and party caucuses.  Several Democratic caucuses have reached 
gender parity, meaning that women occupy about half of the Democratic-held seats in the 
legislature.  There is some variation across Republican caucuses as well.  While this project does 
not dispute the political ambition gender gap and its root causes, I argue that it is unlikely that 





representation observed across the state legislatures.  Instead, the American and comparative 
politics literatures point to many external features of the electoral context that may be facilitating 
or inhibiting the emergence of female candidates, despite the political ambition gender gap.  To 
complement and refine some of these existing institutional and structural explanations, Chapter 2 
introduces the two-part theory of gendered civil society context and local party strength, and the 
hypotheses derived from it, that guides this dissertation project. 
In this chapter, I construct empirical measures of the central concept developed in the 
project – the gendered civil society context (GCSC) – and present quantitative tests of the first 
set of hypotheses, H1a through H1d.  These hypotheses predict a direct relationship between 
gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  More specifically, I employ 
logistic and linear regression to test for a statistical association between GCSC and female 
candidate emergence at the state legislative district and state levels.  Consistent with the 
expectations of the first two hypotheses (H1a and H1b), the results indicate that on average male-
dominated industry groups are far more active than female-dominated industry groups in both 
major parties, and female-dominated industries are more active within the Democratic Party’s 
GCSC than within the Republican Party’s.  Male-dominated industries are also somewhat more 
active within the Democratic Party, compared to the Republican Party, due to the prominence of 
predominantly male labor organizations.   
The regression analyses do indicate that the gendered civil society context is related to 
female candidate emergence, but there are differences between the Democratic and Republican 
parties.  More specifically, more female-dominated gendered civil society contexts are associated 
with more women running in both parties; however, there are higher levels of uncertainty in the 





gendered civil society contexts are associated with fewer Democratic women running for office, 
but unrelated to female candidate emergence in the Republican Party.  The results suggest that 
the gender composition of local stakeholder groups, and the level of their political engagement, 
may indeed influence candidate pipelines with respect to gender even after accounting for other 
factors related to female representation. 
 
Measuring the Gendered Civil Society Context 
 
Gender-balance of Civil Society Groups Based on Industrial Segregation by Sex Data 
The theory of gendered civil society context described in detail in Chapter 2, starts with 
these few basic assumptions.  Civil society groups are influential in local politics, and these 
groups are often more closely aligned with one of the two major political parties.  Within each 
party’s set of stakeholder groups, relative political influence varies by group; in other words, 
some groups wield more power than others.  These politically relevant groups constitute a pool, 
or pipeline, of potential candidates.  Female and male candidates are not equally likely to emerge 
from these potential candidate pools because the leadership and membership of civil society 
groups are not necessarily gender-balanced.  In short, pipelines to political office vary by place, 
by party, and by their gendered composition.  Observing and measuring these dimensions of 
variation in candidate pipelines allow us to determine if and how they are correlated with 
variations in female candidate emergence.  
One important determinant of the gendered nature of civil society groups is industrial 
segregation by sex. Many civil society groups are tied to industries and occupations, which are 





data on the gender composition of industry and occupational classifications.  In Figure 3.1, I 
break these top-level industry categories down into female-dominated industries, male-
dominated industries, and gender-balanced industries.  I coded these as female(male)-dominated 
if over 60% of the industry’s workforce is female(male).  Female-dominated industries include 
healthcare, social assistance, and education. Male-dominated industries include construction, 
energy and natural resources, agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, etc.   
These broad industrial categories include numerous detailed sub-categories.  While the 
gender composition of most sub-categories mirror that of their parent category, some sub-
categories or related occupations have different gender compositions compared to their top-level 
industry sector.  This is especially important to the analysis if these sub-categories have 
politically active associations organized at the sub-category level.  For example, healthcare is 
highly female-dominated; across the industry women make up 76% of the workforce.  However, 
within healthcare, physicians, dentists, and chiropractors are highly male-dominated occupations.  
These are occupations that have politically active medical associations, so it is important to 
classify them correctly given that the gendered composition of these fields starkly contrasts with 
the broader healthcare sector.   
To account for these differences, Figure 3.1 also identifies any industrial sub-categories 
that were re-coded for the gendered civil society context measures.  Within “Other services, 
except public administration,” for-profit correctional facilities and private prisons were recoded 
from gender-balanced to male-dominated, while non-profit foundations were re-coded to female-
dominated.  Within “Public Administration” the courts and justice and military sub-categories 
were recoded from gender-balanced to male-dominated.  Within the “Professional, scientific, and 





from gender-balanced to male-dominated.  Recoding was done by examining the detailed 
industrial and occupational data by sex from the American Community Survey and identifying 
any sub-category with a % Female value that varied substantially from that of its parent category.  
With respect to the gendered civil society context, the assumption I make is that the gender 
composition of a civil society group affiliated with an industry roughly mirrors the gender 
composition of that industry’s workforce. 
Figure 3.1 – Industrial & Occupational Segregation by Sex Data for GCSC Variables 
Gender Composition of Major Industry Categories % Female 
Gendered Civil Society 
Context Category 
Health care and social assistance * 76% 
Female-dominated 
Educational services 66% 
Finance and insurance 56% 
Gender-balanced 
Management of companies and enterprises 51% 
Arts, entertainment, & recreation; Accommodation & food services 45% 
Other services, except public administration * 43% 
Public administration * 43% 
Retail trade 43% 
Real estate and rental and leasing 43% 
Professional, scientific, and technical services * 40% 
Information 37% 
Male-dominated 
Administrative and support and waste management services 36% 
Wholesale trade 28% 
Manufacturing 27% 
Transportation and warehousing 22% 
Utilities 22% 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting; Mining 16% 
Construction 9% 
   
* Industry Categories w/ Recoded Sub-categories % Female 
Gendered Civil Society 
Context Category 
Health care and social assistance     
physicians, dentists, chiropractors 26% - 35% Male-dominated 
Other services, except public administration     
for-profit correctional facilities & private prisons; security services 25% - 28% Male-dominated 
non-profit foundations 69% Female- dominated 
Public administration     
courts & justice 37% Male-dominated 
military 9% - 16% Male-dominated 
Professional, scientific, and technical services     
attorneys, lawyers, law firms 37% Male-dominated 
computer engineering, software, components, services 9% - 38% Male-dominated 






Relative Political Influence of Civil Society Groups Based on Contribution Data 
Next, I identify which industries and groups are active in local politics.  I use campaign 
contribution data as a proxy for activity and relative political influence.  The Follow The Money 
(FTM) database of the National Institute on Money in Politics includes contribution data for state 
legislative races since 2000.  Contributors are classified as individuals or non-individuals.  For 
this project, I only include contributions from non-individuals.  The theory is about the influence 
of stakeholder groups within a party’s local strategic environment, so I am most interested in 
seeing which groups make direct contributions to candidates. This may leave out members of 
groups who make individual contributions influenced by their group membership. For instance, a 
union may endorse a candidate and encourage members to contribute to that candidate.  
However, for this analysis, group contributions are most relevant. 
It is important to note that I am not necessarily looking at contribution data because I am 
interested in money in politics or donations in and of themselves.  Instead I want to emphasize 
the idea of contributions as proxies for relative political influence and activity.  Contribution data 
allows me to identify politically active groups across the country at the state legislative district 
level and to compare the relative influence of these groups using contribution amounts.  As 
mentioned previously, politically relevant groups provide numerous resources to candidates and 
parties, besides money.  However, it would be extremely difficult to identify and compare groups 
by party and level of influence across all state legislative districts by other means.  Contribution 
data has the advantage of being available and comparable for thousands of districts, but it cannot 
capture all the nuances of local political dynamics that are likely important to how groups affect 
candidate emergence.  The data also leave out groups that maybe friendlier with one party but 





to their 501c3 non-profit status (e.g. Rotary Foundation, Planned Parenthood Federation). The 
interview data presented in Chapter 5 delves into some of those nuances and additional civil 
society groups. 
Within the FTM database, each non-individual contributor is classified by three industry 
indicators, in order of level of detail - broad sector, general business, and specific business. The 
industry indicators roughly match the industry classifications used in the American Community 
Survey shown in Figure 3.1.  I created a mapping from the ACS industry classifications to the 
FTM classifications.  Two “broad sector” categories within the FTM database do not map easily 
to the ACS classifications – Single Issue/Ideology and Labor.  The Single Issue/Ideology sector 
in the FTM database includes advocacy groups (e.g. environmental groups, gun rights, gun 
control) and does not have a corollary in the ACS database.  Due to the difficulty in knowing the 
gendered composition of these groups, they are classified as gender-balanced with two 
exceptions. “Women’s Issues” and “Abortion - pro-choice” groups are classified as female-
dominated.  The FTM database also groups all labor unions under the Labor sector, regardless of 
affiliated industry.  Thus, I classified each union within this FTM category according to their 
industry (i.e. teachers unions are within the Educational Services industry). 
Next, I classify all contributors based on their industry’s gendered civil society context 
category – female-dominated, gender-balanced, or male-dominated.  As an extra check for the 
FTM Labor sector, I validated the union GCSC classifications using union membership by sex 
data from the Current Population Survey (https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/cps/data.html).  I sum the contributions to candidates of both major parties by the GCSC 





I narrow my focus to three election cycles 2002/3, 2006/7, 2010/11. These three cycles 
provide some theoretical and practical advantages. Most states have State House/Assembly 
elections every two years but a few have them every four years or on off-federal years (LA, NJ, 
MS, VA).  These three cycles allow me to capture all states, regardless of 2- or 4-year term, in 
non-presidential election years. This is a good test of the theory because it is really about the 
local dynamics that impact candidate emergence. Non-presidential election years are likely to 
better reflect local issues and dynamics.  I use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 
Elections (DIME, Bonica 2016) for candidate gender data, which is updated through 2012.  
I further narrow the universe of data under analysis by looking only at data associated 
with elections for open seats. Open seats are theoretically relevant because I want to see how 
likely a female candidate is to emerge based on the local political dynamics. Elections with 
incumbents running do not allow for a clear assessment of the determinants of candidate 
emergence due to the deterrence effect of incumbency. Prior research has demonstrated that the 
incumbency advantage deters even potentially strong candidates from entering elections (Maisel 
and Stone 1997) and several of the interviewees provided anecdotal evidence about 
incumbency’s negative effect on candidate recruitment.  This is not to say that the GCSC is not 
relevant when incumbents and challengers are present, but open seats provide a better first test 
for the viability of the theory. 
With empirical measures compiled, I can observe the composition of the gendered civil 
society context for each party to evaluate the first two GCSC hypotheses. 
 
Testing Hypotheses H1a and H1b 
   H1a:  The gendered civil society context is more male-dominated than female-dominated 





H1b:  Female-dominated groups will have more relative influence within the Democratic 
Party’s gendered civil society context compared to the relative influence of female-dominated 
groups within the Republican Party’s gendered civil society context. 
 
Figure 3.2 provides data to evaluate hypotheses H1a and H1b, which posit that the civil 
society context is gendered for both parties and that the composition of the GCSC differs by 
party.  The table shows the average proportion of contributions from each GCSC category across 
the 5,173 district-years by party.  To reiterate, these are contributions from institutions/groups to 
candidates running for open state house seats across three election cycles.  The data provide 
some support for both hypotheses.   
Consistent with H1a, for both major parties, contributions from male-dominated groups 
outweigh those from female-dominated groups.  In districts with Democratic candidates, on 
average about 54% of contributions to Democrats come from male-dominated industry groups, 
compared to about 19% from female-dominated groups.  In districts with Republican candidates, 
about 46% come from groups affiliated with male-dominated industries, while only 9% of 
contributions to Republicans come from female-dominated industry groups.    
Moreover, in line with H1b, the differences between the parties are statistically 
significant across the three GCSC categories.  A higher proportion of contributions come from 
female-dominated industries to Democratic candidates (19%) than to Republicans (9%).  I did 
not necessarily have an expectation regarding differences in male-dominated contributions 
between the two parties, but Figure 3.2 illustrates that male-dominated industry groups account 
for a larger share of contributions to Democratic candidates than to Republicans – 54% 
compared to 46% of total contributions.  As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, this is mainly driven by 
the activity of male-dominated unions within the Democratic Party, and the prevalence of 





   Figure 3.2 - GCSC Independent Variables –  




GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 0.089 0.194 
-0.105*** 
[.005] 
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions 0.463 0.536 
-0.0732*** 
[.007] 
GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions 0.448 0.269 
0.178*** 
[.007] 
n (# of district-years) 2538 2635   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
Two-sample t-tests with unequal variances    
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide additional detail about the gendered civil society context for 
each party by illustrating the percent of total contributions by industry sector and GCSC category 
across all district-years16.  On the Democratic side, Labor dwarfs the other sectors, accounting 
for nearly 40% of all group contributions to Democratic candidates.  As noted previously, 
because of how the Labor sector is categorized in the FTM database, the category contains 
unions affiliated with multiple industries, such as education, health, construction, etc.  Within 
Labor, unions affiliated with male-dominated industries comprise over half of those 
contributions, or 22% of total contributions.  Unions affiliated with female-dominated industries 
represent 10% of all group contributions to Democrats.  It is interesting to note that the 
contributions from female-dominated unions is comparable to contributions from the second and 
third highest donor sectors, “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” and “Lawyers and Lobbyists.”  
It appears that female-dominated unions wield substantial relative power within the Democratic 
coalition.  At the same time, male-dominated unions seem to have the most relative influence. 
For Republican candidates, most group contributions came from the “Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate” and “General Business” sectors, which are coded mostly as gender-balanced.  
Group contributions from the Health sector were third highest, and female-dominated industries 
 





comprise about half of that sector’s total.  Clearly female-dominated industries are represented 
less within the Republican coalition.  Yet, the data indicate that gender-balanced industries and 
sectors are represented about equally compared to mainly male-dominated industries. 
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Figure 3.3 - Democratic Party Gendered Civil Society Context,
% Contributions by Industry Sector
Male-dominated Industries Gender-balanced Industries Female-dominated Industries
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Figure 3.4 - Republican Party Gendered Civil Society Context,
% Contributions by Industry Sector





I contend that this contribution data indicates a level of relative political power within the 
party networks.  This means that networks affiliated with female-dominated industries are less 
politically influential than networks affiliated with male-dominated industries in both major 
parties.  If these networks reflect occupational segregation by sex, which seems likely, then 
networks with more women comprise a smaller share of candidate pools than male-dominated 
networks, on average, for both the Democratic and Republican parties.  Moreover, female-
dominated networks appear to be more influential within the Democratic Party than the 
Republican Party. 
 
Gendered Civil Society Context Independent Variables 
The contribution data presented in the previous section, coded by industrial segregation 
by sex, allows me to derive the key independent variables of interest.  These will be used in the 
regression models, which test hypotheses H1c and H1d, presented next:  
 
• GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions:  contributions from female-
dominated groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either 
primary or general election, by district-party-year and by state-party-year  
 
• GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions:  contributions from male-dominated 
groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either primary or 






• GCSC – Gender-balanced Industry Contributions:  contributions from gender-
balanced groups as proportion of total contributions to candidates running in either 
primary or general election, by district-party-year and by state-party-year 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show each party’s distributions for the two main gendered civil 
society context variables of interest at the state-year level.  When comparing the parties, the 
distributions are somewhat different for the GCSC – Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
variable.  For the Republican Party, mostly all state-years have values under 10%, whereas there 
is more variation on the Democratic side with contributions from female-dominated groups 
accounting for over 30% of group contributions in 20 state-years.  The GCSC – Male-dominated 
Industry Contributions variable has a normal distribution for both parties, with the values skewed 
a bit higher for the Democratic Party.  Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the same distributions at the 

















The dependent variables require knowledge of the gender of candidates running for 
office. Candidate gender data is not included in official campaign contribution filing records so it 
is surprisingly difficult to obtain, especially when looking, as I am, at candidates running for 
office for both major parties across thousands of state legislative districts in multiple years.  
Fortunately, the DIME database does include candidate gender data through 2012.   
For each of the two parties separately, I create dependent variables for the state-level and 
district-level regressions.  For the state-level analysis, each party’s dependent variable is the 
percent of all primary and general election candidates who are female by state-year, for open 
seats only.  For the district-level analysis, the dependent variables are binary indicators for 
whether or not at least one female candidate ran in the primary or general election in that district 







 Figure 3.9 shows the distributions of the state-level dependent variables.  They reiterate 
the observation that more Democratic women run for office than Republican women.  Across 
these three election cycles, in most states, over 20% or 30% of Democratic candidates were 
women.  On the other hand, typically women made up less than 20% of Republican candidates. 
 
Figure 3.10 - Presence of Female Candidate Running in Primary or General Election 
for Three Election Cycles by Party, Open Seats Only 
# State House Legislative 






% Elections w/ 
Female Candidate 
Democratic Candidates 862 1773 2635 33% 
Republican Candidates 613 1925 2538 24% 






 Figure 3.10 presents the data for the district-level, binary dependent variables.  Across the 
three election cycles, there were 2,635 races with Democratic candidates competing.  Of those, 
862 district-years, or 33% of races, had at least one female Democrat running in either the 
primary or general election.  Even if a Democratic female candidate lost in the primary for a 
certain district and only male candidates competed in the general, that district would be coded as 
1.  For the 2,538 races with Republican candidates, 613 of them, or 24%, had at least one 
Republican woman running in either the primary or general election. 
 
Control Variables17 
 The regression models presented next include several control variables to account for 
existing explanations for female candidate emergence found in the literature, as described in 
detail in Chapter 1.  These include: term limits, multimember districts, legislative 
professionalism, public campaign financing options, partisanship, traditional political culture, the 
social eligibility pool (indicated by the percent of females with at least a bachelor’s degree), and 
the women-friendly district (WFD) index.  Party strength variables are added to the models 
presented in Chapter 4.  The control variables are all state-level, except for the women-friendly 
district score, which is measured by state house district in the district-level logit regression 
models.  For the state-level OLS models, the district WFD scores are averaged for each state18.  
With respect to expected effects for the institutional control variables, the term limits 
variable is expected to have a positive sign, though research has shown mixed results.  
Originally, they were thought to enable female candidates to overcome the incumbency 
advantage that sitting male legislators experienced (Darcy et. al. 1994).  However, more recent 
 
17 Variable definitions and data sources are listed in the Chapter 3 Appendix, Figure 3.22. 





research shows that the legislative turnover created by term limits does not necessarily increase 
female representation because of the limited pipeline of willing female candidates, particularly 
on the Republican side (O’Regan and Stambough 2017).  Legislative professionalism is expected 
to have a negative sign, because the more professionalized the legislature, the more competitive 
the elections, which would disadvantage women, who are more hesitant to compete in elections 
to begin with (Kanthak and Woon 2015).  Scholars have found some evidence that states with 
multimember districts and those with public campaign financing options tend to have higher 
levels of female representation, so these variables are expected to have positive signs (Norrander 
and Wilcox 2014; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016). 
Cultural and socioeconomic variables may also explain some of the variation in female 
representation across legislatures and party caucuses.  In general, the literature would suggest 
that the more right-leaning a state, in terms of Republican partisanship, the lower its predicted 
level of female representation.  This is based on the gender gap in American politics, which 
shows that for the past several decades women have affiliated with the Democratic party at 
higher rates than men (Carroll and Fox 2014, Chapter 4; Huddy et. al. 2008; Osborn and Kreitzer 
2014, 184-185; Pogionne 2004, 308-312).  Political culture is another structural variable of 
interest.  Many studies have tested the relationship between Elazar’s (1984) state-level political 
culture measures and female representation; he classified states according to three political 
cultures -- traditional, moralistic, and individualistic -- based on the dominant perceptions of 
politics and political operations in the states (Norrander and Wilcox 2014). In “traditional 
political culture” states, largely found in the South, politics is seen as defending traditional 
values, including traditional gender roles.  Thus, traditional political culture is expected to be 





Scholars employ a few composite measures to capture structural macro-level factors such 
as the “women friendly districts” (WFD) and the social eligibility pool indices (Palmer and 
Simon 2008; Pyeatt and Yanus 2016; Sanbonmatsu 2002). In the following regression models, 
the social eligibility pool is indicated by female educational attainment.  The more highly 
educated and professional women in a state, the larger the pool of potential candidates, so a 
positive effect on female candidate emergence is expected.  Adapted from Palmer and Simon’s 
(2008) study of female representation in Congress, Pyeatt and Yanus (2016) apply the WFD 
concept to female representation in state legislatures.  The WFD index is compiled from 12 
factors for each district19: % urban, % African American, % Hispanic, % foreign born, % college 
educated, % school age, % blue collar workforce, Republican partisanship, conservative 
ideology, median income, district size, Southern.  They find that the index has a positive and 
substantive effect on both the emergence and success of female candidates, so a positive sign is 
expected for this variable in the following regressions. 
 
Testing Hypotheses H1c and H1d 
H1c:  Higher relative influence of female-dominated networks in gendered civil society 
context → Higher likelihood of female candidates 
 
H1d:  Higher relative influence of male-dominated networks in gendered civil society 
context → Lower likelihood of female candidates 
 
In this section I employ regression analysis to test the relationship between the gendered 
civil society context and female candidate emergence.  I use logistic regression for a district-









District-level Logistic Regression Analysis 
This section presents the results of the district-level analyses that test H1c and H1d.  I use 
logistic regression to see if the gendered civil society context variables have statistically 
significant effects on the likelihood of a female Democratic (Republican) candidate running in a 
district-year.  I expect the GCSC – Female-dominated variable to have a positive sign 
(hypothesis H1c) and the GCSC – Male-dominated variable to have a negative sign (H1d).  
Figure 3.11 presents the results (Models 3-1 through 3-9), which indicate support for both 
hypotheses, even after controlling for other variables known to impact female candidate 
emergence. 
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 present graphs of Model 3-1 and 3-220.  Consistent with H1c, the 
predicted probability of a female candidate running increases by about 20 percentage points 
when moving from low contributions from female-dominated industry groups to high 
contributions from such groups.  For example, for the Democratic Party, in districts where 
contributions from female-dominated groups are near zero, there is a 25% chance of a female 
Democratic candidate running.  Where such contributions are much higher, the likelihood of a 
female Democratic candidate competing is over 40%.  Conversely, the GCSC – Male-dominated 
variable (Figure 3.13) is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a female candidate by 
about ten percentage points as you move from districts with low values to those with high values 
on this variable.  The effects of the GCSC – Male-dominated and GCSC – Female dominated 
variables are statistically significant across models, with the expected signs.  Also noteworthy is 
that the gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant in models 3-3 and 3-8, as expected.
 
20 The control variable values used to generate the graphs presented throughout Chapters 3 and 4 are meant to 
represent a “typical” state: Term Limits = 0, Multimember Districts = 0, Traditional Political Culture = 0, Public 
Campaign Funding = 0, and mean values for the other control variables (Republican Partisanship, Female College 





Figure 3.11 - District-level Logit Models 
DV = Female Candidate 

































0.416*** 0.391*** 0.376*** 0.417*** 0.424*** 0.455*** 0.436*** 0.424*** 0.456*** 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] 
Multimember District 
0.323*** 0.336*** 0.354*** 0.320*** 0.563*** 0.522*** 0.550*** 0.562*** 0.522*** 
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
Republican Partisanship 
1.017*** 1.048*** 1.012*** 1.032***      
[0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31]      
Traditional Political Culture 
0.018 -0.032 -0.009 0.003 0.09 0.089 0.058 0.101 0.081 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.030*** 0.024** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.007 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Legislative Professionalism 
1.298*** 1.258*** 1.302*** 1.279*** 0.697* 0.656* 0.635* 0.713* 0.642* 
[0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] [0.37] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.283** 0.301** 0.310*** 0.282** 0.169 0.152 0.165 0.167 0.152 















0.336*** 0.483*** 0.441*** 0.370*** 0.336*** 0.242*** 0.369*** 0.311*** 0.257*** 
[0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.974***   0.824***  0.929***   0.868*** 
[0.17]   [0.19]  [0.21]   [0.23] 
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions 
 -0.520***  -0.244*   -0.388**  -0.101 
 [0.13]  [0.14]   [0.15]  [0.17] 
GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions 
  -0.011     -0.136  
  [0.14]     [0.17]  
Women-friendly District Score 
    0.090*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 
        [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
 
constant 
-2.496*** -1.995*** -2.271*** -2.332*** -2.067*** -2.253*** -1.887*** -2.021*** -2.194*** 
 [0.27] [0.27] [0.27] [0.29] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.35] 
  n 5173 5173 5173 5173 3643 3643 3643 3643 3643 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Notes: Data sources are listed in Figure 3.22 in the appendix.  Unit of analysis is state house district-party-year.  There are many missing values 
for the Women-friendly District Score variable, which reduces the number of observations by 1,530 in Models 3-5 through 3-9.  Republican 





Figure 3.12 - Predicted Probability of Female Candidate Emergence by GCSC - Female-
dominated Industry Contributions by Party (Model 3-1) 
 
Figure 3.13 - Predicted Probability of Female Candidate Emergence by GCSC - Male-dominated 







 In terms of control variables, term limits and multimember districts are statistically 
significant and have the expected positive signs across all nine models.  The percentage of 
female college graduates and public campaign funding are also positive, as expected, but they are 
only significant in Models 3-1 through 3-4, which do not include the WFD variable.  Due to 
missing data, over 1,530 observations drop out of the models that include WFD – Models 3-5 
through 3-9.  This may affect the Public Campaign Funding variable in those models because 
only five states have public funding, three of which are excluded because of missing WFD 
scores21.  The female college graduates variable may lose significance in Models 3-5 through 3-9 
because the WFD variable better captures the effects of the social eligibility pool.  The WFD 
variable is positive and significant in Models 3-5 through 3-9.  Traditional political culture is not 
significant in any of the district-level models.  Both Republican partisanship and legislative 
professionalism are statistically significant, but their signs are unexpected.  Both variables would 
be expected to have a negative effect on female candidate emergence, but instead they are 
positively associated with it in these models. 
The Democratic Party dummy variable is positive and significant across the board 
indicating differences across the two major parties.  In Figures 3.12 and 3.13, these differences 
are indicated by the difference in intercept, or the starting point for the predicted probability for 
each party, but the slopes are the same.  To accurately assess the differences across the parties, 
the models must include interaction terms between the Democratic Party and GCSC variables.  
Figure 3.14 presents the results of adding interaction terms to models 3-1 and 3-2.  I focus on 
these models due to the missing data issues in models 3-5 through 3-9. 
 
21 States with Public Campaign Funding options include Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota.  
Districts in the dataset from Connecticut, Maine, and Minnesota did not have WFD scores, so those are some of the 
observations dropped from Models 3-5 through 3-9.  Other states dropped from those models include: Arkansas, 





Figure 3.14 - District-level Logit Models with Interaction Variables 
DV = Female Candidate 
in Primary or General Election (binary) 























Traditional Political Culture 
0.025 -0.035 
[0.12] [0.12] 

























GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.594*  
[0.35]  
Dem Party * GCSC - Female-dominated 
0.50  
[0.40]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions 
 -0.113 
 [0.20] 
Dem Party * GCSC - Male-dominated 
 -0.694*** 




 [0.27] [0.29] 
  n 5173 5173 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
 The inclusion of interaction terms does change the nature of the results with respect to the 
relationship between the gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 illustrate the differences.  For the Republican Party, the GCSC – Female-
dominated variable exerts a statistically significant, positive effect on the likelihood of female 
candidate emergence, but uncertainty in the estimates increases dramatically as one moves along 
the x-axis (Figure 3.15).  Also, for the Republican Party, the GCSC – Male-dominated variable 
does not affect the likelihood of female candidate emergence as the predicted probability is 





 It is a different story on the Democratic side.  Both the female-dominated and male-
dominated GCSC variables have statistically significant and substantive effects in the expected 
directions for the Democratic Party.  As seen in Figure 3.15, the likelihood of a Democratic 
female candidate increases from about 25 % to nearly 50% as GCSC – Female-dominated 
contributions increase.  Conversely, Figure 3.16 shows that the likelihood decreases by about 15 
percentage points as GCSC – Male-dominated contributions increase. 
Figure 3.15 – Effect of GCSC-Female-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-10) 
 






 Overall, the interaction models create a mixed picture for Hypotheses H1c and H1d.  The 
hypotheses are supported on the Democratic side, but not fully on the Republican side.  One 
factor that may partially explain this is that there is very minimal variation in the GCSC – 
Female-dominated variable when looking at districts with Republican candidates.  As Figure 3.7 
illustrates most districts with Republican candidates running have female-dominated 
contributions of less 10% of total contributions.  Interview data presented in Chapter 5 also helps 
to shed light on these differences between the parties. 
 
State-level Regression Analysis Results 
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to see how well the GCSC measures scale 
up to the state level.  State-level analyses may be less effective at capturing the relationship 
between GCSC and female candidate emergence than district-level analysis because total level of 
contributions may vary widely across districts.  For example, in a given state, a small district 
with relatively low campaign spending could have a high proportion of contributions from 
female-dominated groups.  However, that one district’s amount would not have much of an 
effect on the state’s total contributions if many other districts have much higher levels of 
contributions.   
I calculate the state-level GCSC independent variables by summing total contributions to 
Democratic (Republican) candidates by the three GCSC categories (female-dominated, male-
dominated, and gender-balanced) and determining each category’s proportion of total 
contributions.  I choose this approach because I think it makes future use and replicability of 
these variables more likely and accessible.  An alternate approach would be to take the average 





regarding diminished influence of districts with low total contributions22.  However, this 
approach would require collecting data at the district-level, which may not be feasible for other 
scholars who may use this variable in future female representation research. 
Models 3-A through 3-I test if the state-level GCSC independent variables are associated 
with the percent of female Democratic (Republican) candidates running for open seats across 
three election cycles; the unit of analysis is state-party-year.  I do not control for party strength 
variables yet because they will be covered in Chapter 4.  Figure 3.17 displays the results. 
With respect to the relationship between the gendered civil society context and female 
candidacies, state models 3-A through 3-D are mostly consistent with the district-level results.  
The main GCSC variables are statistically significant with the expected signs in these models.  In 
other words, a more female-dominated GCSC is associated with more female candidates, while a 
more male-dominated GCSC is associated with fewer female candidates.  Again, the gender-
balanced GCSC variable is not significant. 
 
22 Here is an example to illustrate the differences in approach to measuring the GCSC variables.  Imagine a state 
with two districts – District A and District B.  Total group contributions to Democratic candidates in District A 
equal $10,000, with $5,000 coming from female-dominated groups and $5,000 from male-dominated groups.  So for 
District A, the district-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable equals 50% and the GCSC – Male-dominated value 
is 50%.  Total group contributions to Democratic candidates in District B equal $30,000, with $5,000 coming from 
female-dominated groups and $25,000 from male-dominated groups.  So for District B, the district-level GCSC – 
Female-dominated variable equals 16.7% and the GCSC – Male-dominated value is 83.3%.  The district-average 
method to calculate the state-level GCSC variables weights each district the same, regardless of their difference in 
total contributions.  So using the district-average method, the state-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable would 
equal 33.4% ((50% + 16.7%)/2), and the state-level GCSC – Male-dominated value would be 66.6% ((50% + 
83.3%)/2).  Alternatively, using the state totals method, contributions from each GCSC category are summed and 
compared to the state’s total contributions.  In this example, across the state’s two districts, total contributions equal 
$40,000.  Contributions from female-dominated groups equal $10,000 and those from male-dominated groups equal 
$30,000.  Thus, under this approach, the state-level GCSC – Female-dominated variable value is 25% and the state-
level GCSC – Male-dominated value is 75%.  The relative political influence of female-dominated groups appears 
lower using the state totals method compared to the district-average method.  Theoretically, the district-average 
method is preferable because it does not weigh District A less than District B, just because District A has lower total 
contributions.  Afterall, both districts will (typically) have one representative, who gets elected by working within 
the local political dynamics of her district.  In this example, female-dominated groups have fairly high levels of 
relative political influence in District A, but this influence is somewhat diluted at the state-level using the state totals 
method.  However, calculating these measures at the district-level may not always be practical, and the state totals 
methods certainly streamlines the process.  So, I chose to use the state totals method to see if the results are 





Figure 3.17 – State-level OLS Regression Models 
DV = % Female Candidates 
Model 3-A Model 3-B Model 3-C Model 3-D Model 3-E Model 3-F Model 3-G Model 3-H Model 3-I 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.02 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.022 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Multimember District 
-0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.032 0.037 0.03 0.038      
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]      
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.064*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.065** -0.063** -0.065** -0.067** -0.065** 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.133* -0.114 -0.121* -0.118* -0.150* -0.154* -0.148* -0.144* -0.149* 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.044* 0.053** 0.053** 0.049** 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.049 0.045 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Democratic Party 
0.076*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.082*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.146**   0.09  0.038   0.008 
[0.06]   [0.07]  [0.08]   [0.08] 
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions 
 -0.133***  -0.109**   -0.068  -0.066 
 [0.04]  [0.05]   [0.06]  [0.06] 
GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions 
  0.059     0.045  
  [0.04]     [0.05]  
Women-friendly District (state avg) 
    0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
    [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
constant 
0.028 0.139** 0.054 0.103* 0.071 0.063 0.1 0.054 0.097 
[0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
n 283 283 283 283 206 206 206 206 206 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01          
 
Notes: Data sources are listed in the table in the appendix.  Unit of analysis is state-party-year.  Thirteen states have missing values for the 
Women-friendly District score variable, which reduces the number of observations in Models 3-E through 3-I.  Republican Partisanship is 





 Models 3-E through 3-I include the WFD state average score variables, which again 
results in a sizeable reduction in observations due to missing data.  In these models, the GCSC 
variables are not significant.  The only variables that are significant are traditional political 
culture (negative effect), legislative professionalism (negative effect), and the Democratic party 
dummy variable (positive effect).  Given the missing data and overall lower explanatory power 
of these five models (i.e. lower R-squared values), I instead focus on models 3-A through 3-D. 
 While the effects of the GCSC variables in models 3-A through 3-D are consistent with 
the district-level results, there are several differences among the control variables.  In the state 
models, term limits, multimember districts, and Republican partisanship do not meet the 
threshold of statistical significance.  Traditional political culture was not significant in the district 
analysis, but in the state-level models this variable is significant with the expected negative 
effect on female candidate emergence.  Similar to the district models, female college graduates 
and public campaign funding are significant with positive signs, as expected.  Legislative 
professionalism is significant at the .1 level in three of the four models.  In these models, the 
variable has the expected negative effect, in contrast to the district models in which this variable 
had a positive sign. 
 Again, the Democratic party variable is positive and significant across the models, 
indicating the need to assess the different effect by party using interaction terms.  Figure 3.18 
shows the results of adding the party-GCSC interaction variables to models 3-A and 3-B, thereby 
creating models 3-J and 3-K.  Figures 3.19 and 3.20 present these models graphically and the 
patterns are very similar to those of the district-level analyses (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16).  The 
level of female-dominated contributions is associated with more female candidates in both 





association between contributions from male-dominated groups and female candidacies is even 
more pronounced on the Democratic side in the state-level analysis, while there is still no 
association on the Republican side. 
 
Figure 3.18 – State-level OLS Regression Models with Interaction Variables 
DV = % Female Candidates 











Traditional Political Culture 
-0.067*** -0.067*** 
[0.02] [0.02] 












GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.247**  
[0.12]  
Dem Party * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.138  
[0.14]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.012 
 [0.06] 






R-squared 0.25 0.28 
n 283 283 










Figure 3.19 - Effect of GCSC-Female-dominated on Female Candidate Emergence (Model 3-J) 
 









 The analyses presented thus far indicate that groups affiliated with male-dominated 
industries are more active within both parties compared to groups affiliated with female-
dominated industries.  On average, female-dominated industries are more active within the 
Democratic Party than within the Republican Party.  Male-dominated groups are also more 
active within the Democratic Party’s GCSC, but to a lesser extent, and this is mostly driven by 
the activity of labor associations within male-dominated industries.  Within both parties, more 
politically active female-dominated industries are associated with more women running for 
office, but there is a lot of uncertainty in the statistical effects on the Republican side.  Within the 
Democratic Party, more politically active male-dominated industries are associated with fewer 
women running for office, while there is no association for the Republican Party.  Overall, the 
gendered civil society context appears to provide a promising new explanation for female 
candidate emergence, even after taking other possible explanations from the literature into 
account, especially for the Democratic Party.  The next chapter will address the second part of 






Chapter 3 – Appendix 
 
Figure 3.21 - Data Table for Figures 3.3 and 3.4 – GCSC Contributions by Industry Sector 
All States  















Democratic     42,218,194      26,728,542      14,210,143        83,156,880  
 
  
Labor     18,142,348        6,494,544        8,415,617        33,052,509  
 
39.7% 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate                    -          9,307,258                     -            9,307,258  
 
11.2% 
Lawyers & Lobbyists       7,870,883           806,380                     -            8,677,263  
 
10.4% 
Health       3,097,757                     -          4,127,444          7,225,200  
 
8.7% 
General Business       1,684,436        5,225,297                     -            6,909,733  
 
8.3% 
Ideology/Single Issue                    -          3,017,915        1,113,489          4,131,404  
 
5.0% 
Energy & Natural Resources       3,305,288                     -                       -            3,305,288  
 
4.0% 
Construction       3,141,498                     -                       -            3,141,498  
 
3.8% 
Communications & Electronics       1,982,312           448,396                     -            2,430,708  
 
2.9% 
Government Agencies/Education/Other            90,713        1,401,903           478,833          1,971,449  
 
2.4% 
Agriculture       1,499,007                     -               74,761          1,573,768  
 
1.9% 
Transportation       1,403,952                     -                       -            1,403,952  
 
1.7% 
Defense                    -               26,850                     -                 26,850  
 
0.0% 
Republican     33,109,000      31,136,245        7,267,566        71,512,811  
 
  
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate                    -        13,932,013                     -          13,932,013  
 
19.5% 
General Business       2,523,590      10,686,420                     -          13,210,010  
 
18.5% 
Health       4,038,792                     -          4,904,858          8,943,650  
 
12.5% 
Construction       7,048,514                     -                       -            7,048,514  
 
9.9% 
Energy & Natural Resources       5,230,434                     -                       -            5,230,434  
 
7.3% 
Agriculture       4,297,470                     -             211,285          4,508,755  
 
6.3% 
Lawyers & Lobbyists       3,109,078        1,172,278                     -            4,281,356  
 
6.0% 
Labor       2,021,121           339,967        1,571,896          3,932,984  
 
5.5% 
Ideology/Single Issue                    -          3,738,384           157,447          3,895,830  
 
5.4% 
Transportation       2,633,330                     -                       -            2,633,330  
 
3.7% 
Communications & Electronics       2,178,137           392,255                     -            2,570,391  
 
3.6% 
Government Agencies/Education/Other            26,285           829,709           422,080          1,278,073  
 
1.8% 









Figure 3.22 - Information for Control Variables used in Regression Models in Chapters 3 & 4 
Variable Name Variable Definition Data Source 
Term Limits 
binary indicator 
(1 = term limits,  
0 = no term limits) 





(1 = mmd,  
0 = no mmd) 








scale of -1 to 1 
(-1 = more Democratic,  
1 = more Republican) 
Partisanship Means 1996-2006 from Norrander and 
Monzano 2010 replication data available on Norrander's 
website (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~norrande/data.html) 
Traditional Political Culture 
four-point scale based on Elazar 1984 
(1 = traditional,  
.6 = mixed, traditional dominant,  
.3 = mixed, traditional non-dominant,  
0 = not traditional) 
Mead, Lawrence M. 2004. “State Political Culture and 
Welfare Reform.” Policy Studies Journal 32 (2): 271–96. 
doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2004.00065.x. (pg. 275) 
Female College Graduates 
% 
% of females age 25 and over with a 
bachelor’s or higher degree 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 2007–2009 
American Community Survey (ACS) 3-Year Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data. (prepared July 2011) 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012001.pdf (pg. 33) 
Legislative Professionalism 
scale from 0 to 1,  
higher values more professional 
values from 2003, Correlates of the States database. 
Jordan, Marty P. and Matt Grossmann. 2020. The 
Correlates of State Policy Project v.2.2. East Lansing, MI: 
Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR). 
Public Campaign Funding 
binary indicator  
(1 = public funding,  
0 = no public funding) 







scale from 0 through 12 
data shared with me by Pyeatt and Yanus, which was the 
basis for their 2016 article, “Shattering the Marble Ceiling: 
A Research Note on Women-Friendly State Legislative 
Districts.” Social Science Quarterly 97 (5): 1108–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12294. 
Traditional Party Structure 
(Mayhew) 
scale from 1 to 5 based on Mayhew 
1986;  
(1 = no historical presence of 
traditional party structure,  
5 = strong historical presence of 
traditional party structure) 
Mayhew, David R. 1986. Placing Parties in American 
Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government 
Activity in the Twentieth Century. Book, Whole. Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press. (pg. 196) 
Party Strength (Cotter) 
Democratic parties:  
scale from -.871 to 1.441 
Republican parties:  
scale from -1.457 to 1.581 
Cotter, Cornelius P., et. al. 1984. Party Organizations in 
American Politics. American Political Parties and Elections. 








The Role of Party Strength in Female Candidate Emergence 
Overview 
The previous chapter tests the project’s first main set of hypotheses – the direct 
relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence; and this chapter tests the second 
set of guiding hypotheses (H2a and H2b) – the moderating effect of party strength on that 
relationship.  In other words, does level of party strength change the nature of the relationship 
between GCSC and female candidate emergence?  If so, how?  And are there differences 
between the Democratic and Republican parties? 
Chapter 3 showed that groups affiliated with male-dominated industries are more active 
within both parties compared to groups affiliated with female-dominated industries, and that 
female-dominated industries are more active within the Democratic Party than within the 
Republican Party.  Moreover, male-dominated labor organizations are major components of the 
Democratic Party’s gendered civil society context.  Regarding the relationship between gendered 
civil society context and female candidate emergence, more politically active female-dominated 
industries are associated with more women running in both parties.  Moreover, more politically 
active male-dominated industries are associated with fewer Democratic women running for 
office but are unrelated to female Republican candidacies.  The gendered civil society context 
appears to have a direct effect on female candidate emergence, especially within the Democratic 
Party. 
Quantitative tests of H2a and H2b are presented in this chapter.  My theory suggests that 
the GCSC sets the stage for the strategic behavior of political parties.  A gendered civil society 





nominate female candidates tied to these networks.  Where parties exert more control over 
candidate nomination – in other words, where party strength is higher -- this effect is expected to 
be greater.  Similar to Chapter 3, regression analysis is performed at the district and state levels.  
As a robustness check, models are presented with two different measures of party strength used 
in the literature, one from Mayhew (1986) and the other from Cotter, et. al. (1984). 
In general, the models do not provide strong evidence of a moderating effect of party 
strength.  The models including the Cotter variable suggest that the relationship between GCSC 
and female candidacies does not change based on party strength for the Republican Party.  On 
the Democratic side, some models suggest a negative direct effect of party strength, while one 
model indicates a moderating effect opposite of what H2a predicts.  In other words, a more 
female-dominated GCSC increases female candidate emergence more where Democratic party 
organizations are weaker.  On the other hand, a model using the Mayhew variable indicates that 
higher party strength does amplify the positive association between a female-dominated GCSC 
and female candidacies within the Republican Party, as H2a predicts.  Overall, despite these few 
examples, the quantitative results do not support the party strength hypotheses as formulated in 
the theory. 
There are several reasons why this may be the case.  While these variables are commonly 
used in the female representation literature, they are quite dated.  Furthermore, the party strength 
measures are averaged at the state level (Mayhew) or the state-party level (Cotter), so they are 
not specific to the districts23.  A more recent district-level party strength variable would allow for 
 
23 Of course, district-specific party strength measures would be very difficult to obtain for all state legislative 
districts in the country.  There are over 4,800 state house districts and measures would be needed for both major 
parties for each one.  Moreover, party committees are typically organized by county, and counties and state 
legislative districts are not perfectly aligned, which may complicate assigning party strength indicators to the 






a more accurate test of the theory.  This is because state-level average values mask any district-
level party strength variation; in other words, state-level and district-level values may not be 
highly correlated, thus making the state-level variable a poor proxy for district party strength. 
Aside from practical data issues, there are likely important theoretical explanations for 
the null findings.  In Chapter 2, I suggest that stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, which 
could create strategic advantages for the party.  The comparative literature discussed in Chapter 
1 suggests that this has happened in some European countries, where left-leaning parties 
responded to demands from civil society to increase female representation (Krook 2010c).  In 
turn, these parties implemented tools to do just that (e.g. candidate gender quotas), thus 
responding to dynamics within civil society and increasing the pipeline of female candidates.  On 
the other hand, the reverse logic could also make sense.  Where local party organizations are 
weaker, civil society groups may be able to garner more political power and thus have more 
influence over candidate selection.  This mechanism was addressed in some of my interviews 
with party leaders, which are the subject of Chapter 5.  For example, a Republican party chair in 
Georgia, where party committees are relatively weak, addressed some challenges with respect to 
candidate recruitment and how civil society groups and the local party are not necessarily 
working in concert. 
“There's always those people who've never been involved in the party, don't even know 
that the party exists, really, but they want to run for office. They've always voted 
Republican. So they go down and they qualify for that office. And they've talked to 
maybe their homeowner’s association, or they've talked to their fellow members of the 
Kiwanis or Rotary club, or they've been involved in [local] business associations. […] 
there may be a little bit of crossover [between these groups and the party committee], 
[…] but in terms of anything formal, or even kind of a loose association, there isn't one. 
[…] And that's part of the challenges you have in candidate recruitment […] -- the party's 
not necessarily the only one doing it.” (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020)24 
 





Even where party committees are stronger, like in New York, the effect of the party on 
candidate selection may be contingent on the nature of the relationship between the party 
organization and certain groups.  The interviews show that these relationships can be very 
idiosyncratic and not necessarily related to party strength.  For example, several Democratic 
party chairs discussed local Indivisible groups and other Trump resistance-related groups that 
formed after the 2016 election.  In some cases, there was synergy between the groups and the 
party committee resulting in membership crossover, joint meetings, and even candidate 
emergence.  In other counties, the relationship was not close.  In some cases, the resistance 
groups sought to maintain a nonpartisan stance, while others were more progressive and took a 
somewhat anti-establishment posture toward the local party committee.  In all these cases, the 
civil society groups affected local political dynamics, including candidate emergence, but the 
interactions between groups and party organizations were complex. 
 The results presented in this chapter and the next indicate that both the gendered civil 
society context and local party organizations impact candidate emergence.  However, the concept 
of party strength, while likely relevant, does not necessarily lead to a predictable effect on female 
candidate emergence.  The data presented in these two chapters may shed light on why there are 
mixed findings and competing theories in the literature with respect to the relationship between 
party strength and female representation. 
 
Testing Hypotheses H2a and H2b 
H2a:  The positive effect of a more female-dominated gendered civil society context on 
female candidate emergence is stronger as level of party strength increases 
 
H2b:  The negative effect of a more male-dominated gendered civil society context on 






To test for a moderating effect of party strength on the relationship between GCSC and 
female candidate emergence, this chapter adds party strength and interaction variables to the 
regression analyses presented in Chapter 325.  Three sets of regressions were run for both the 
district and state levels.  First, party strength variables were added alone to the Chapter 3 models 
to see if they exert a direct effect on female candidate emergence and if their addition 
substantively changes the results.  Next, an interaction term combining GCSC and party strength 
was added to see if the relationship between GCSC and female candidate emergence changes at 
different levels of party strength.  Finally, a three-way interaction term was added to determine 
any differences between the two major parties. 
As noted, I used two different measures of party strength.  The Traditional Party 
Structure variable, derived from Mayhew (1986), is common in the literature.  This variable is 
not ideal because it is a state-level indicator, and not measured at the state-party level.  It 
classifies states on a scale of 1 to 5 based on the historical presence of patronage-based, 
hierarchical party organizations that seek to influence candidate nominations, among other things 
(Sanbonmatsu 2002, Norrander and Wilcox 2014).  I also use the Local Party Organizational 
Strength measures from Cotter, et. al. (1984), which are available at the state-party level, and 
thus a better fit for the analysis.  The values by state are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 









Figure 4.1 – Party Strength Measures from Cotter, et. al. (1984, 52-53) and Mayhew (1986, 196)  
State 
Local Party Organization Strength (Cotter) Traditional Party Organization 
(Mayhew) Democratic Republican 
New Jersey 1.441 1.581 5 
Pennsylvania 1.033 0.943 5 
New York 0.962 1.107 5 
Delaware 0.899 0.647 4 
Indiana 0.794 1.004 5 
Rhode Island 0.783 0.380 5 
Ohio 0.752 0.782 4 
New Hampshire 0.650 -0.015 1 
Connecticut 0.626 0.649 5 
Illinois 0.599 0.622 5 
Maryland 0.531 0.872 5 
Michigan 0.464 0.594 1 
Hawaii 0.439 0.476 1 
Idaho 0.417 0.176 1 
Washington 0.406 0.615 1 
Maine 0.311 0.199 1 
Florida 0.307 -0.758 1 
North Dakota 0.297 0.339 1 
Alaska 0.234 -0.184 1 
Utah 0.228 -0.433 1 
Minnesota 0.227 0.342 1 
New Mexico 0.204 0.688 2 
Tennessee 0.203 0.049 2 
California 0.202 0.705 1 
North Carolina 0.194 0.260 1 
Wisconsin 0.175 0.314 1 
Iowa 0.132 0.376 1 
Oregon 0.051 0.101 1 
Vermont -0.045 -0.576 1 
Arizona -0.051 0.810 1 
Colorado -0.063 0.111 1 
Virginia -0.072 0.123 2 
West Virginia -0.099 0.200 4 
South Dakota -0.109 -0.121 1 
Wyoming -0.125 0.297 1 
South Carolina -0.131 -0.058 1 
Missouri -0.145 -0.425 4 
Massachusetts -0.150 -0.309 1 
Montana -0.155 -0.217 1 
Oklahoma -0.341 -0.252 1 
Kentucky -0.354 -0.696 4 
Nevada -0.493 0.269 1 
Alabama -0.574 -0.621 1 
Arkansas -0.579 -0.325 2 
Kansas -0.598 -0.230 1 
Georgia -0.626 -1.457 2 
Mississippi -0.671 -0.318 1 
Texas -0.717 -0.423 2 
Louisiana -0.871 -0.607 3 
Maximum 1.441 1.581 5 
Minimum -0.871 -1.457 1 






District-level Logistic Regression Analysis 
 Figure 4.2 shows the results of adding the party strength variables to the district-level 
models, thereby testing for the direct effect of party strength on female candidate emergence.  As 
noted in Chapter 1, existing American and comparative research that has explored this 
relationship has hypothesized, and found, effects in both positive and negative directions.  Both 
the Cotter and Mayhew variables are significant at the .01 level with negative signs across all 
models.  In other words, these results suggest that higher levels of party strength are associated 
with lower levels of female candidate emergence. 
Figure 4.2 – District-level Logit Models with Party Strength Variables 
DV = Female Candidate 
in Primary or General Election (binary) 
Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 Model 4-4 Model 4-5 Model 4-6 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.363*** 0.340*** 0.321*** 0.382*** 0.358*** 0.342*** 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Multimember District 
0.387*** 0.396*** 0.419*** 0.318*** 0.332*** 0.350*** 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.880*** 0.918*** 0.869*** 0.453 0.516 0.439 
[0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.34] [0.34] [0.34] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.161 -0.199 -0.191 -0.084 -0.126 -0.107 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.024** 0.019* 0.020** 0.026*** 0.021** 0.022** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Legislative Professionalism 
1.682*** 1.623*** 1.700*** 1.205*** 1.176*** 1.213*** 
[0.34] [0.34] [0.34] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.347*** 0.363*** 0.377*** 0.191 0.216* 0.217* 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Democratic Party 
0.334*** 0.480*** 0.436*** 0.335*** 0.480*** 0.436*** 
[0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] 
Party Strength (Cotter) 
-0.224*** -0.212*** -0.231***    
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08]    
Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)    
-0.093*** -0.088*** -0.095*** 
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.969***   0.972***   
[0.17]   [0.17]   
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.501***   -0.490***  
 [0.13]   [0.13]  
GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions   
-0.031   -0.045 
  [0.14]   [0.14] 
constant 
-2.354*** -1.870*** -2.121*** -2.161*** -1.693*** -1.926*** 
[0.28] [0.28] [0.27] [0.28] [0.28] [0.28] 
n 5173 5173 5173 5173 5173 5173 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      





 The effects of the gendered civil society context variables are consistent with the Chapter 
3 results, despite the addition of the new variables.  The GCSC – Female-dominated variable is 
positive and significant in models 4-1 and 4-4, indicating that more contributions from female-
dominated groups are associated with a higher likelihood of female candidates.  The reverse is 
true, as expected, for the GCSC – Male-dominated variable in models 4-2 and 4-5.  And finally, 
as a check, the gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant in models 4-3 and 4-6. 
 The effects of the control variables are also basically unchanged compared to Chapter 3 
in the models including the Cotter measure (models 4-1 through 4-3).  In the models including 
the traditional party structure (Mayhew) variable (models 4-4 through 4-6), the effects of 
Republican partisanship and public campaign funding are different.  Republican partisanship is 
not significant in the Mayhew models, while public campaign funding is significant in two of the 
three models and at a lower level of statistical significance -- .1 rather than .05. 
 The models presented in Figure 4.3 include interaction terms combining party strength 
with the GCSC variables.  This tests whether or not party strength moderates the relationship 
between the gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  The interaction 
variables are not significant in models 4-7 through 4-10, while the party strength and GCSC 
variables maintain their independent effects in most, but not all, models.  This indicates a lack of 
support for the hypotheses predicting a moderating effect of party strength. 
 To fully interpret the models, it is best to assess the results graphically, but to do that 
meaningfully, differential effects for each party must also be considered.  Therefore, Figure 4.4 
presents models (4-11 through 4-14) including three-way interactions between party strength, 
gendered civil society context, and the Democratic Party dummy variable.  The results are 





Figure 4.3 - District-level Logit Models with Party Strength * GCSC Interaction Variables 
DV = Female Candidate 
in Primary or General Election (binary) 
Model 4-7 Model 4-8 Model 4-9 Model 4-10 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.364*** 0.341*** 0.384*** 0.363*** 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Multimember District 
0.387*** 0.400*** 0.322*** 0.339*** 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.879*** 0.916*** 0.471 0.503 
[0.31] [0.31] [0.34] [0.34] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.165 -0.199 -0.079 -0.119 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.024** 0.019* 0.026*** 0.021** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Legislative Professionalism 
1.671*** 1.628*** 1.215*** 1.169*** 
[0.34] [0.34] [0.31] [0.31] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.344*** 0.361*** 0.195 0.210* 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Democratic Party 
0.335*** 0.479*** 0.340*** 0.489*** 
[0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
1.008***  0.825***  
[0.18]  [0.27]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.470***  -0.251 
 [0.13]  [0.21] 
Party Strength (Cotter) 
-0.187** -0.093   
[0.09] [0.14]   
Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.244    
[0.32]    
Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.248   
 [0.24]   
Traditional Party Structure   
-0.104*** -0.034 
  [0.03] [0.05] 
Traditional Party * GCSC - Female-dominated   
0.068  
  [0.10]  
Traditional Party * GCSC - Male-dominated    
-0.113 
   [0.08] 
constant 
-2.366*** -1.889*** -2.141*** -1.820*** 
[0.28] [0.28] [0.28] [0.30] 
n 5173 5173 5173 5173 









Figure 4.4 - District-level Logit Models with Three-way Interactions 
DV = Female Candidate 
in Primary or General Election (binary) 
"Party Strength" = 
Local Party Strength (Cotter) 
"Party Strength" = 
Traditional Party Organization 
(Mayhew) 
Model 4-11 Model 4-12 Model 4-13 Model 4-14 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.360*** 0.344*** 0.385*** 0.368*** 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Multimember District 
0.379*** 0.383*** 0.332*** 0.334*** 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.870*** 0.850*** 0.481 0.465 
[0.31] [0.32] [0.34] [0.34] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.165 -0.211 -0.071 -0.125 
[0.14] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.025** 0.021** 0.026*** 0.022** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Legislative Professionalism 
1.675*** 1.618*** 1.185*** 1.135*** 
[0.34] [0.34] [0.31] [0.31] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.335*** 0.337*** 0.199* 0.200* 
[0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] 
Democratic Party 
0.293*** 0.830*** 0.552*** 0.896*** 
[0.08] [0.14] [0.14] [0.23] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.634*   0.366  
[0.37]   [0.66]  
Party Strength 
-0.117 -0.045 -0.043 -0.014 
[0.12] [0.18] [0.04] [0.06] 
Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.11   0.094  
[0.61]   [0.20]  
Dem * Party Strength 
-0.211 -0.15 -0.129** -0.06 
[0.16] [0.27] [0.05] [0.09] 
Dem * GCSC - Female-dominated 
0.479   0.297  
[0.42]   [0.73]  
Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
0.03   0.091  
[0.72]   [0.23]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.06  -0.034 
 [0.20]  [0.33] 
Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.208  -0.033 
 [0.35]  [0.13] 
Dem * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.703***  -0.465 
 [0.27]  [0.44] 
Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.01  -0.069 
 [0.49]  [0.17] 
constant 
-2.353*** -2.127*** -2.214*** -2.052*** 
[0.28] [0.29] [0.29] [0.33] 
n 5173 5173 5173 5173 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 






The graphs in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 display the three-way interaction models (4-11 and 4-
12) that include the Cotter measures26.  For the Republican Party, these models indicate no 
significant effects for the GCSC variables, party strength, nor for the interactions.  On the 
Democratic side, the independent direct effects of GCSC and party strength are evident, but there 
is no indication of an interaction effect based on party strength.  In other words, regarding the 
direct effects, the GCSC – Female-dominated and GCSC – Male-dominated variables retain their 
respective positive and negative effects on the likelihood of female candidacies.  Also, party 
strength has a negative effect on female candidate emergence, evidenced by the lower intercept 
for the high party strength scenario.  However, if party strength moderated the relationship 
between GCSC and female candidate emergence, then the slopes of the green and orange lines 
would differ.  Instead, they are basically parallel for the Democratic Party in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, 
indicating the absence of a moderating effect. 
Figure 4.5 – Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence 
(District Model 4-11) 
 
 
26 The following variable values were used to generate the Chapter 4 graphs: term limits = 0; multimember districts 
= 0; Republican partisanship = mean; traditional political culture = 0; female college graduates = mean; legislative 
professionalism = mean; public campaign funding = 0; high party strength (Cotter) = 1.4, low party strength (Cotter) 





Figure 4.6 - Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence 





 Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the district models that include the traditional party structure 
(Mayhew) variable.  For the Republican Party, these models similarly indicate no effects.  On the 
Democratic side, Figure 4.7 does show a steeper positive slope for the high party strength 
scenario, when examining the relationship between a female-dominated GCSC and female 
candidate emergence.  This would suggest that stronger party organizations may amplify the 
effects of the GCSC, as H2a predicts.  However, this is not very strong evidence, and it is 
contradicted by the state-level models presented next.  There is no interaction effect evident 
when considering model 4-14, which includes the male-dominated GCSC variable.  When 
looking at the Democratic side of Figure 4.8, there appears to be a negative direct effect of party 
strength (i.e. lower intercept for high party strength), but the slopes are basically parallel 





Figure 4.7 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate 




Figure 4.8 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate 









State-level OLS Regression Analysis 
Figures 4.9 through 4.11 present the state-level regression results.  The party strength 
variables are added in Figure 4.9; in contrast to the district-level analysis party strength is not 
significant across the models.  The Cotter variable (in Models 4-A through 4-C) has a negative 
sign, but it does not reach statistical significance in any model.  The traditional party structure 
variable also has a negative sign in Models 4-D through 4-F, but it is significant in only two of 
the three models at either the .05 (4-D) or .1 (4-F) level.  So compared to the district models, 
there is less evidence of a direct relationship between party strength and female representation. 
Figure 4.9 – State-level OLS Models with Party Strength Variables 
DV = Proportion Female Candidates 
Model 4-A Model 4-B Model 4-C Model 4-D Model 4-E Model 4-F 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.018 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.01 0.008 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Multimember District 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.029 0.034 0.026 -0.036 -0.013 -0.03 
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.067*** -0.071*** -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.081*** 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004** 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.123* -0.108 -0.11 -0.136** -0.118* -0.127* 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.046* 0.054** 0.055** 0.036 0.047* 0.045* 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Democratic Party 
0.076*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.075*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
Local Party Strength (Cotter) 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.008    
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]    
Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)    
-0.010** -0.007 -0.009* 
   [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.145**   0.150**   
[0.06]   [0.06]   
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.132***   -0.122***  
 [0.04]   [0.04]  
GCSC - Gender-balanced Industry Contributions   
0.057   0.043 
  [0.04]   [0.05] 
constant 
0.03 0.140** 0.056 0.066 0.162*** 0.091 
[0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 
n 283 283 283 283 283 283 





 The GCSC – Female-dominated and GCSC – Male-dominated variables are statistically 
significant with the expected positive and negative signs, respectively, in Models 4-A, 4-B, 4-D, 
and 4-E.  The gender-balanced GCSC variable is not significant, as expected, in Models 4-C and 
4-F.  The Democratic Party dummy variable is also positive and significant across all models. 
 The other control variables are largely unchanged compared to the state-level models 
presented in Chapter 3.  Term limits, multimember districts, and Republican partisanship are all 
not significant in any state model, in contrast to the district models.  Traditional political culture 
is not significant in the district analysis, but in the state-level models this variable is significant 
with the expected negative effect on female candidate emergence.  The female college graduates 
variable is significant across all models and public campaign funding is significant in five of six 
models; both variables have positive signs, as expected.  Legislative professionalism is 
significant in four of the six models.  Like the Chapter 3 state-level results, this variable has the 
expected negative sign, in contrast to the district models in which this variable has a positive 
sign. 
 Figure 4.10 presents the models with the party strength-GCSC interaction terms.  Across 
all four models, the GCSC variables maintain their expected direct effects and significance.  
However, the interaction term is only significant in one model, 4-G.  Model 4-G, which includes 
the GCSC-Female-dominated and the Cotter party strength variables, shows a positive and 
significant coefficient for the GCSC variable and a negative and significant coefficient for the 
interaction term.  This would indicate that higher party strength reduces the positive association 
between a female-dominated gendered civil society context and female candidate emergence.  
Since the Democratic Party variable is significant in all models, it again necessitates the 





interaction models are presented in Figure 4.11, and they are presented graphically in Figures 
4.12 through 4.15. 
Figure 4.10 - State-level OLS Models with Party Strength * GCSC Interactions 
DV = Proportion Female Candidates 
Model 4-G Model 4-H Model 4-I Model 4-J 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.018 0.014 0.013 0.01 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Multimember District 
-0.01 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.033 0.035 -0.036 -0.013 
[0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.070*** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.076*** 
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.006*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004** 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.124* -0.108 -0.137** -0.118* 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.046* 0.054** 0.036 0.047* 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Democratic Party 
0.076*** 0.098*** 0.075*** 0.097*** 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.199***  0.161*  
[0.07]  [0.09]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.134***  -0.125* 
 [0.05]  [0.07] 
Local Party Strength (Cotter) 
0.028 -0.01   
[0.02] [0.05]   
Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.257**    
[0.12]    
Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
0.013   
 [0.09]   
Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew)   
-0.009 -0.008 
  [0.01] [0.01] 
Traditional Party * GCSC - Female-dominated   
-0.006  
  [0.03]  
Traditional Party * GCSC - Male-dominated    
0.002 
   [0.03] 
constant 
0.02 0.142** 0.065 0.164** 
[0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
n 283 283 283 283 







Figure 4.11 - State-level OLS Models with Three-way Interactions 
DV = Proportion Female Candidates 
"Party Strength" =  
Local Party Strength (Cotter) 
"Party Strength" =  
Traditional Party Structure 
(Mayhew) 
Model 4-K Model 4-L Model 4-M Model 4-N 
B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] B/[se] 
Term Limits 
0.017 0.012 0.014 0.011 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Multimember District 
-0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.015 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Republican Partisanship 
0.031 0.028 -0.028 -0.017 
[0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] 
Traditional Political Culture 
-0.073*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.073*** 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Female College Graduates % 
0.006*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Legislative Professionalism 
-0.130* -0.097 -0.140** -0.106 
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] 
Public Campaign Funding 
0.041* 0.051** 0.036 0.048** 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Democratic Party 
0.083*** 0.221*** 0.101*** 0.347*** 
[0.02] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] 
GCSC - Female-dominated Industry Contributions 
0.240*   -0.267  
[0.12]   [0.20]  
Party Strength 
-0.001 0.012 -0.016* 0.019 
[0.03] [0.06] [0.01] [0.02] 
Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
0.128   0.212***  
[0.26]   [0.07]  
Dem * Party Strength 
0.037 -0.078 -0.007 -0.080*** 
[0.05] [0.10] [0.01] [0.03] 
Dem * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.054   0.400*  
[0.15]   [0.22]  
Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Female-dominated 
-0.471   -0.218***  
[0.31]   [0.08]  
GCSC - Male-dominated Industry Contributions  
-0.012   0.059 
 [0.07]   [0.10] 
Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.011   -0.029 
 [0.12]   [0.04] 
Dem * GCSC - Male-dominated  
-0.244***   -0.402*** 
 [0.09]   [0.14] 
Dem * Party Strength * GCSC - Male-dominated  
0.087   0.107* 
 [0.18]   [0.06] 
constant 
0.022 0.087 0.061 0.046 
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08] 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.31 
n 283 283 283 283 







 Figure 4.12 shows the moderating effect of party strength (Cotter) on the relationship 
between the GCSC-Female-dominated variable and female candidate emergence.  On the 
Republican side, there is no statistical difference between levels of party strength.  However, the 
Democratic graph shows that there is a positive relationship between a female-dominated 
gendered civil society context and female candidacies where party strength is low, but the 
relationship actually reverses where party strength is high.  As noted in the overview section of 
this chapter, this is the opposite of what hypothesis H2a would predict.  H2a posits that the 
positive relationship would be stronger in the high party strength scenario.  Instead, it could be 
that strong parties play a gatekeeping role that disadvantages female candidates, as suggested by 
Sanbonmatu (2006).  Or, where parties are weaker, civil society groups have more power to 
influence local politics and candidate emergence.  Alternatively, this could be a spurious finding 
since it is not robust to changes in party strength measure (Cotter vs. Mayhew) or to level of 
analysis (district vs. state). 
Figure 4.12 – Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence 






 Figure 4.13 displays the moderating effect of party strength (Cotter) on the relationship 
between the GCSC-Male-dominated variable and female candidate emergence.  On the 
Republican side, there is no difference based on level of party strength, and the lack of 
relationship between the GCSC variable and female candidacies is consistent with the other 
models presented so far.  There is also no statistical difference based on party strength on the 
Democratic side.  While the negative slope is steeper in the low party strength scenario, the 
confidence intervals overlap, so inferences cannot be made from this model.  
Figure 4.13 - Effect of GCSC & Local Party Strength (Cotter) on Female Candidate Emergence 
(State Model 4-L) 
 
 Figures 4.14 and 4.15 replace the Cotter party strength variable with the Mayhew 
traditional party structure variable.  The only instance of a clear moderating effect by party 
strength is on the Republican side in Figure 4.14.  It shows that where parties are stronger, a 
female-dominated gendered civil society context is associated with more female Republican 





and hypothesis H2a, would predict.  However, since the results are not consistent across models 
and levels of analysis, I am hesitant to draw any conclusions from this. 
Figure 4.14 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate 
Emergence (State Model 4-M) 
  
 
Figure 4.15 - Effect of GCSC & Traditional Party Structure (Mayhew) on Female Candidate 







Overall, the models presented in this chapter do not provide confirmatory evidence for 
the second portion of my theory regarding the moderating effect of party strength.  The district-
level models do suggest a negative direct effect of party strength; however, those results do not 
hold up in the state-level models.  As noted previously, there are various potential explanations 
for why this may be.  Aside from practical data issues (i.e. party strength measures that are dated 
and not district-specific), theoretical issues are likely also at play.  In Chapter 2, I suggest that 
stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, which could create strategic advantages for the party; 
and there is some evidence for this mechanism in the European context.  On the other hand, the 
reverse could be true.  Where local party organizations are weaker, civil society groups may have 
more political power to influence candidate selection.  Still another possibility is that strong 
party organizations in the US serve as institutional gatekeepers, as Sanbonmatsu (2006) suggests, 
and they are not very responsive to the gendered civil society context with respect to candidate 
selection.  Some of these possibilities and open questions are explored through interviews with 
local party leaders in Chapter 5. 
 The results presented in this chapter and the next indicate that both the gendered civil 
society context and local party organizations impact candidate emergence.  However, the concept 
of party strength, while likely important, does not necessarily lead to a predictable effect on 
female candidate emergence, especially given the quantitative measures of party strength that are 
available.  The data presented in these two chapters help explain why there are mixed findings 
and competing theories in the literature with respect to the relationship between party strength 







Female Candidate Emergence in Georgia and New York 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I explore the dynamics of the gendered civil society context and party 
strength in two states – Georgia and New York.  I interviewed 30 Democratic and Republican 
county party chairs across the two states in order to assess the main hypotheses of the project, to 
the extent possible, and to explore additional factors related to female candidate emergence and 
to candidate emergence and recruitment more generally. 
 In the following sections, I explain my rationale for selecting these two states.  They are 
meant to be pathway cases (Weller and Barnes 2016, Gerring and Cojocaru 2016), which means 
they exemplify the expected effects of hypotheses in the quantitative analyses presented in 
Chapter 3.  In addition, they vary by party strength, with NY having stronger party organizations 
than Georgia according to the party strength measures presented in Chapter 4.  I also explain my 
procedures for recruiting interviewees and conducting semi-structured telephone interviews.  
Next, I explain the findings and synthesize the main conclusions drawn from these cases. 
 There was a common sentiment across the party chairs I spoke with in both states, 
regardless of party – prior community engagement is critical for successful candidacies.  
However, the types of engagement and organizations mentioned did differ across the states and 
parties in ways that point to gendered differences in candidate pools.  In other words, the 
interviews bolster the quantitative findings that gendered civil society contexts indeed impact the 
likelihood of female candidate emergence.  As the hypotheses predict, Democratic chairs tend to 





mentioned by Republican chairs.  Moreover, male-dominated unions were mentioned as 
important stakeholders in interviews with Democratic party chairs in New York, while unions of 
all types were not a major factor in the interviews with Democratic chairs in Georgia, given its 
right to work laws.  Thus, this difference in importance of male-dominated groups may help to 
explain why the Democratic caucus in Georgia outperforms that in New York with respect to 
female representation. 
 The interviews also shed light on why the theory of gendered civil society context is 
more effective in explaining female candidate emergence on the Democratic side in the 
quantitative models presented in the previous chapters.  A few chairs explicitly discussed the 
impression that the Democratic Party has more overtly political allied groups in its network 
compared to the Republican Party.  To be sure, the interviews – consistent with my theory – 
suggest that civil society groups are important in both parties.  However, it seems that candidate 
emergence within Republican networks is more driven by personal connections and social 
interactions within the groups as opposed to candidate emergence from the networks of advocacy 
and other stakeholder groups that have strong institutional ties to Democratic party 
organizations.  These findings are in line with the asymmetric politics theory about the 
differences in the nature of the two major parties offered by Grossmann and Hopkins (2015, 
2016).  They argue that the Democratic Party has evolved as a coalition of interest groups in 
contrast to the Republican Party which evolved to serve as a vehicle for the ideological 
conservative movement.  The case studies presented in this chapter indicate that groups are 
important for candidate emergence in both parties, but in different ways. 
In terms of causal mechanisms, I explored the extent to which civil society groups push 





society leaders ever approach a party leader to suggest that an individual should run for office?  
Although I found more evidence of this on the Democratic side rather than the Republican side, 
this mechanism seemed infrequent compared to other modes of candidate emergence, such as 
recruitment or the reliance on potential candidates coming forward on their own.  On the 
Democratic side, in NY some Democratic chairs mentioned that trade unions would suggest 
candidates and in Georgia some women’s groups would do so as well.  On the Republican side, 
only one GOP chair mentioned that such a thing would happen.  It is important to note also that 
some organizations may push candidates to run without going through the county party 
committees, especially where party organizations are weaker and ballot access is easier, like in 
Georgia.  Some chairs mentioned this happening, but it was impossible to explore that 
mechanism in depth through interviews with party chairs. 
 I also explored if parties pull potential candidates from civil society organizations.  I did 
find evidence of this mechanism at work across states and parties.   However, on the Republican 
side this mainly happens through informal personal networks rather than through formal 
integration between certain groups and party organizations.  Informal personal connections were 
also important for candidate emergence on the Democratic side, but the interviews suggest that 
there are more formal ties between allied groups and Democratic party organizations that can 
facilitate candidate emergence.  Interviewees also provided some insight into the gendered nature 
of civic groups and the extent to which certain professional backgrounds are relevant for 









As mentioned, for the case analyses I selected Georgia and New York.  I roughly used 
selection processes laid out by Weller and Barnes (2016), Gerring and Cojocaru (2016), and 
Seawright and Gerring (2008).  For the case studies, I am engaging in “pathway analysis” as 
described by Weller and Barnes (2016) as:  
a mode of qualitative research that is part of a mixed-method research agenda, which 
seeks to (1) understand the mechanisms or links underlying an association between some 
explanatory variable, X1, and an outcome, Y, in particular cases and (2) generate insights 
from these cases about mechanisms in the unstudied population of cases featuring the 
X1/Y relationship. (426) 
 
The authors outline two main criteria for selecting cases, as follows. 
(1) The first goal of pathway analysis suggests the expected relationship criteria, 
which means the degree to which individual cases are expected to feature the relationship 
of interest between X1 and Y, given existing theory, empirical knowledge, and large-N 
studies.  
(2) The second goal of pathway analysis implies the need to consider variation in 
case characteristics, meaning the extent to which the cases selected vary in terms of the 
X1/Y relationship, the X values, and the Y values. (Weller and Barnes 2016, 430) 
 
For the first criteria, I calculated the average GCSC Female-dominated Contributions 
values by state for districts with and without women candidates.  Several states, including both 
NY and GA, exemplify the expected X/Y relationship on the Democratic side.  In other words, 
as Figure 5.1 shows, female-dominated contributions were higher, and male-dominated 
contributions were lower, in races with female candidates compared to races with only male 
candidates.  The same is not true for the Republican Party as seen in Figure 5.2, but that is not 
surprising given the high uncertainty on the Republican side in the quantitative analyses.  For the 





high party strength, and GA represents low party strength as evidenced by the party strength 
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Figure 5.1 - Average GCSC Contributions to Democrats
for Districts with and without Female Candidates
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Figure 5.2 - Average GCSC Contributions to Republicans
for Districts with and without Female Candidates





I contacted almost all the Democratic and Republican county party chairs across Georgia 
and New York using email addresses found on the state party websites.  I interviewed five 
Democratic chairs and seven Republican chairs in GA and 11 Democratic chairs and seven 
Republican chairs in NY, totaling 30 semi-structured interviews.  Interviews were conducted 
over the phone and lasted an average of 45 minutes.  Some party chairs responded to my email 
solicitation but declined to be interviewed because the party organization was so minimal in the 
given county that they barely even field candidates let alone engage in candidate recruitment.  
This was most common among Democratic chairs in small rural counties in GA.  The interview 
questions and associated IRB documentation are included in Appendix A at the end of the 
dissertation. 
 
Overview of Female Representation in Georgia and New York 
In Georgia, the Democratic caucus in the lower chamber reached gender parity around 
2012 (Figure 5.3, blue line), with just under 50% of Democratic seats in the GA Assembly held 
by women.  Democrats were losing ground in the Assembly after 2004 (purple line), when the 
Democratic seat-share dropped from 60% to just over 40%.  Democrats continued to lose seats 
and held between 30% and 40% of the Assembly over the past 15 years.  However, Democratic 
women continued to make up a larger and larger share of these Democratic seats over this same 
period (blue line).  It seems that Democratic women were holding onto or winning more seats 
than their male counterparts since 2005.  While the Democratic party may have been struggling 







It is mainly a story of stagnation when considering female representation within the 
Republican Party in Georgia’s lower chamber.  Female legislators have comprised between 10% 
and 15% of the Republican caucus for the past 20 years (red line).  Even as the Republican Party 
has greatly increased its share of seats in the legislature, female Republicans have not 











Figure 5.3 – Female Representation in the Georgia State House, 2000 - 2019
% Democratic Seats % Female in Democratic Caucus










Figure 5.4 – Female Representation in the New York State Assembly, 2000 - 2019
% Democratic Seats % Female in Democratic Caucus





 In New York, female representation in total in the lower chamber was mostly stagnant 
from 2000 through 2014, and then ticked upward due to increasing female representation within 
the Democratic Party (Figure 5.4, green line).  Starting in 2015, female representation within the 
Democratic caucus began steadily increasing from about 30% to nearly 45% in 2019 (blue line).  
The partisan composition of the Assembly has stayed fairly constant over the past 20 years – 
around 70% Democratic (purple line).  During this time, the Republican Party has actually 
experienced a decline in female representation.  About 20% of Republican seats were held by 
women in 2000, while women make up only 10% of the Republican caucus in 2019 (red line). 
 
Interviewee Recruitment and County Characteristics 
Georgia – Democratic Party 
Figure 5.5 – County Characteristics for Georgia Democratic Chair Interviews 
County Code/Alias Region of State Population Urban/Rural/Mix 
GA_Dem_1 southeast small urban 
GA_Dem_2 central large urban 
GA_Dem_3 northwest large urban 
GA_Dem_4 north large urban 
GA_Dem_5 west central large urban 
 
 Georgia has 159 counties, of which 98 have organized Democratic committees.  I 
contacted 89 of the chairs using public information from the state party website; four did not 
have email addresses listed and five were undeliverable.  Four chairs responded but declined to 
be interviewed because their committees were very weak and they did not field candidates 
because of the dominance of the Republican Party in their counties.  They were focusing on 
establishing the party organization and thus could not speak to issues of candidate emergence.  





despite multiple attempts, I was not able to interview leaders from the major metropolitan areas 
in Georgia, where the Democratic party is most competitive. 
 Figure 5.5 shows the characteristics of the counties of the chairs I did interview.  The 
population column indicates whether the county has a population over 80,000 (large) or under 
80,000 (small).  I chose that threshold because that is how the Republican Party of Georgia 
designates the counties.  It is an arbitrary cut-off but gives a sense of the size of the county.  The 
urban/rural/mix column is derived from 2010 census data.  If the county was over 60% urban, 
then the county is classified as urban, if the county was less than 40% urban, it is classified as 
rural, and between 40% and 60% is classified as a mix.  Across the five counties, the average 
population was 149,000 and the average portion of the population living in an urban area was 
83%.  Thus, the chairs I interviewed were from large, but not huge, counties throughout the state 
where most of the population live in urbanized areas. 
 Three of the five counties were described as Republican strongholds, while the 
Democratic Party is somewhat more competitive in the other two (GA_Dem_2 and GA_Dem_5).  
In terms of party organizational strength, the chairs described them as fairly weak and rebuilding 
in all of the counties expect for GA_Dem_2, where the committee was a bit more stable and 
established.  Based on state party rules, county parties do not endorse candidates in primary 
elections, though this is not much of an issue for the chairs I spoke with because they struggle to 
field Democratic candidates at all, let alone have multiple Democratic candidates vying for a 








Georgia – Republican Party 
Figure 5.6 – County Characteristics for Georgia Republican Chair Interviews 
County Code/Alias Region of State Population Urban/Rural/Mix 
GA_Rep_1 east small mix 
GA_Rep_2 east central small rural 
GA_Rep_3 south small rural 
GA_Rep_4 north small urban 
GA_Rep_5 south small mix 
GA_Rep_6 north large urban 
GA_Rep_7 central small rural 
 
 To solicit interviews with Republican county party leaders in Georgia, I contacted the 
chairs of 92 of the 129 organized committees with available contact information27.  Ultimately, I 
interviewed seven Republican chairs, and the characteristics of their counties varied a bit more 
compared to my Democratic interviews in GA, as seen in Figure 5.6.  Six of the seven counties 
have populations under 80,000, ranging from about 11,000 to 70,000, and the other county was 
the largest of the GA interviews with a population of nearly 700,000.  In terms of urbanization, 
three were rural, two urban, and two urban-rural mixes.  According to the chairs, three of the 
counties are fairly competitive with respect to partisanship – GA_Rep_3, GA_Rep_5, and 






27 There was no contact information listed for 7 of the 136 organized Republican county parties.  I did not contact 37 
Republican chairs.  Soliciting and scheduling interviews was an iterative process.  Once I had a number of 
interviews scheduled that was comparable to my Democratic interviews, I decided to move on to recruiting for my 
New York interviews.  The 37 chairs to whom I did not reach out were non-incumbents – so they would presumably 
have limited historical knowledge of candidate emergence dynamics – and were from small counties (under 80,000 
populations).  I already had several small-county interviews scheduled.  For future research, if I conduct more 
interviews across Georgia, I may contact these chairs and, perhaps more importantly, focus on recruiting chairs of 





New York – Democratic Party 
Figure 5.7 – County Characteristics for New York Democratic Chair Interviews 
County Code/Alias Region of State Population Urban/Rural/Mix 
NY_Dem_1 west large mix 
NY_Dem_2 central small mix 
NY_Dem_3 east central large urban 
NY_Dem_4 east small rural 
NY_Dem_5 central large mix 
NY_Dem_6 east central small mix 
NY_Dem_7 north small rural 
NY_Dem_8 southeast large urban 
NY_Dem_9 east small rural 
NY_Dem_10 west small mix 
NY_Dem_11 west small mix 
 
New York – Republican Party 
Figure 5.8 – County Characteristics for New York Republican Chair Interviews 
County Code/Alias Region of State Population Urban/Rural/Mix 
NY_Rep_1 southeast large mix 
NY_Rep_2 central large rural 
NY_Rep_3 east central large urban 
NY_Rep_4 north large rural 
NY_Rep_5 central large mix 
NY_Rep_6 east central small mix 
NY_Rep_7 north small rural 
 
 New York has 62 counties and I emailed the Democratic and Republican party chairs for 
all of them.  Ultimately, I interviewed 11 Democratic and seven Republican chairs.  As seen in 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8, the counties represented in the interviews exhibit variation across the three 
dimensions of region, population, and urbanization for both parties.   
 
Three Categories of Major Findings 
 In this section I present the interview findings according to major themes, and I organized 





Contexts,” which investigates the existence and relevance of the main concept developed in this 
dissertation and explores how GCSCs vary by party and by state.  The second category is 
“Candidate Recruitment by Party Leaders,” which identifies some main trends in recruitment and 
how recruitment is related to the gendered civil society context and party strength.  “Assessment 
of Causal Mechanisms” is the third category in which I examine the two main mechanisms 
proposed in the theory regarding the interaction between party organizations and GCSC. 
 
1. Gendered Civil Society Contexts 
Civil Society Engagement Crucial for Potential Candidates across Parties and States 
 The interviews allowed me to assess how relevant the concept of GCSC is in the real 
political world.  In general, the interview data confirm that civil society contexts matter, they 
are likely gendered, and they vary across parties and geographies.  Virtually all interviewees 
stressed the importance of prior community engagement for potential political candidates.  To 
garner this information, I asked interviewees what qualities or characteristics would make for a 
high quality candidate for their party in their county.  There are several common characteristics 
mentioned, but among the most important was significant engagement in the community as 
evidenced by participation in local groups, volunteerism, or local leadership positions (e.g. on 
board of local hospital or museum).   
This level of engagement signaled a few things to party leaders that indicated a 
potentially successful candidate.  First, name recognition is important.  Voters will know the 
names of prominent community members, which is a major advantage in the ballot box.  
Second, being publicly engaged indicates a dedication to improving the community and a 





mentioned as important.  Additionally, being well-known increases the network of potential 
donors that a candidate can tap into, and several chairs stressed the ability to fundraise as critical 
for success.  The concept of GCSC is meant to capture the very networks of civic, social, and 
professional groups mentioned by the interviewees.  Thus, the qualitative data bolstered my 
confidence in the existence and relevance of the GCSC to candidate emergence.  The chair of 
GA_Dem_2 summed up the importance of community engagement. 
When you talk about trying to win a local political seat […] the first thing [the average 
voter is] looking for is name recognition. And so, if you live in a community and you're 
not actively involved in your community, you know, in different organizations, how [are] 
people in your community going to know who you are? 28 (GA_Dem_2, 11/12/2019) 
 
 A Democratic chair of a small rural county in NY (NY_Dem_4), NY_Dem_6, and a 
Republican chair of a larger NY county (NY_Rep_1) said very similar things regarding how 
they would identify high quality candidates: 
So I consciously look at […] community organizations, groups, clubs, PTAs, firehouses, 
Elks club, Rotary, all of those organizations.  All of the community-based organizations 
have leaders that could potentially run for office. And so how we recruit is we use our 
connections. […] So it's identifying the characteristics of a leader and then going and 
finding those people outside of elective service, outside of government, and then asking 
them the question: have you ever thought about running for office before? (NY_Dem_4, 
2/3/2020) 
 
Someone that is involved civically, whether it's in the fire department or the American 
Legion for veterans or little league or school activities.  There are some folks that 
naturally gravitate to being involved in their community, […] you know, through the 
Lions Club, the Elks Lodge, […] a women's club. […] We've got folks that are in our 
communities that are actively involved like that, and we naturally aspire to get them 
involved if we could. (NY_Rep_1, 2/6/2020) 
  
I think that somebody that's already committed to the community through their 
involvement in not-for-profit agencies or the PTA or little league or something like that, 
somebody that already shows a predilection towards service, that would be willing to 
serve in a broader way is what I would look for. And I think the people that we've 
elected are all people that are like that. They want to give back, they want to serve. 
(NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020) 
 





 The chair of a much larger downstate suburban county committee (NY_Dem_8) 
described a similar approach to finding good candidates.  When asked for some more specific 
examples of groups, he mentioned Indivisible, library boards, school boards, and unions. 
So we're constantly at our executive meetings, reminding people, ‘You know, we've got 
an election coming up a year from now. Let's start looking at the PTA groups, the school 
boards, the community groups, the civic associations and the like.  See who you've got 
that you might want to bring to our attention’. (NY_Dem_8, 2/6/2020) 
 
 The Democratic chairs in Georgia mentioned women’s groups, alumni chapters of 
African American fraternities and sororities, and churches in addition to being involved in 
education and social justice activism.  Unions are not powerful political players within the 
Democratic party in the counties that I investigated.  Generally, unions are weak in Georgia 
given its “right to work” laws, although local unions may be more of a factor in the major 
metropolitan counties, the chairs of which I did not interview.  The chair of GA_Dem_3 
described the civic activity of a recent successful candidate for a local seat:   
He is very, very involved in the largest Black church in town. And very involved in the 
community. He’s also served on [inaudible] committees, […] NAACP and Martin 
Luther King commission. So there’s definitely an element of social activism or social 
engagement, like being on local boards or committees is definitely an asset in this 
community. (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019) 
 
 The GA_Dem_5 chair similarly explained what it takes to be a good Democratic 
candidate in her county and the activity of a current candidate for local office: 
We have a pretty strong group of activists groups here that try to address issues like 
voting rights of felons or educational support to provide for a successful school system. 
And there is a Southern anti-racist network group here […]  There's actually one 
candidate who is running this year and, and she's an example of this. She goes to different 
church activities where they might be having a mentor program for middle schoolers or 
she might go to a conference on what can we do to mentor young men in the high 
schools. […] We have some groups that try to bring prison reform to the forefront. […] 





least on the Democratic side of the house. So they -- these churches and/or sororities and 
fraternities -- will put on a lot of different programs. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020) 
 
 She emphasized that given their non-profit status, these churches, sororities, and 
fraternities are very cognizant of the limits on the political behavior in which they can engage.  
However, these groups are important sources of civic engagement and networking in the South 
that lead to party officials identifying leaders who they may try to recruit as potential candidates.  
She explained that the groups did not approach the party committee to suggest candidates in her 
experience, but she emphasized the importance of these organizations and alluded to the 
possibility of identifying leaders and potential candidates. 
I think that those are very important political entities in the South[…] What I found was 
that churches and sororities, fraternities were very organized as far as their politics, doing 
things like, helping to register voters, helping to get voters to the polls, helping to conduct 
voter education, making sure people knew where their precincts were or if there were any 
changes to those precincts or anything like that. That was the real organization in the 
rural South. […]  What I'm seeing is it that, especially in the Black community, these 
sororities and fraternities are lifelong sources of volunteering and community and […] 
they are very, very important. So these are sororities and fraternities that these people 
were in while they were in college. And then after they get out, they still have chapters in 
which they do lots and lots of volunteering and fundraising for these areas that they want 
to support, […] but they're supposed to be politically neutral […] So they're very aware -- 
the church is too -- of what the line is that they can't cross. And so they're careful about 
that. But nonetheless, they tended to be, in my experience, very organized and most of 
them were definitely more Democrat than Republican. […]  Because it's organized, you 
start to see who the people are that are more active, more passionate. And so I think that 
that's an important relationship in politics in the rural South. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020) 
 
The chair of GA_Dem_1 was even more direct about trying to recruit candidates from 
local chapters of African American sororities and fraternities: 
I speak at events and […] we have some sororities and fraternities in the area -- for 
African Americans, big sororities and fraternities -- and I go speak at some of those 
meetings and try to encourage people since there's a lot of leaders already there to run 






There were clear differences between the types of community involvement mentioned 
by Republican chairs compared to those mentioned by Democratic chairs in Georgia.  A few 
Republican chairs mentioned the Chamber of Commerce, local business associations, or hunting 
clubs as types of groups from which candidates might emerge, but generally the GOP party 
leaders did not emphasize groups as part of the party networks in any formal capacity.  Instead, 
community engagement was noted as an important factor for candidate success, but through 
personal networks or being well known either through professional activities, churches, service 
clubs (i.e. Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions) or by being from a prominent local family with long-term 
roots in the county.  Most chairs did not emphasize certain professional experiences that would 
be advantageous to Republican candidates, but when professions were mentioned they included 
law enforcement, finance, defense, law, real estate, and local business ownership – professions 
that are not female-dominated. 
 The chair of GA_Rep_1 opined about a few potential candidates, who are male, and why 
they would be good: 
You have to think in terms of sound principles to promote free markets. […] Now the 
one guy I'm thinking about […] I think he would be good [because] he has a real grasp 
of money and finance. […] He would understand state budgeting and be sober about 
state budgeting, state spending. […] Now another guy I was thinking about […] he is a 
lawyer, has a sense, does a lot of defense work.  […] the point is, he's got legal 
knowledge. (GA_Rep_1, 1/13/2020) 
 
 When asked about characteristics of successful candidates in her county, GA_Rep_2 
said the following: 
Roots in the community, family going back […] three or four generations, positions in 
the community, professions and occupations […] in a particular area -- like the young 
man that is now our economic development head for the County and working with the 
Chamber is third generation. He worked in the juvenile justice system in the County for 






Emphasizing the small town feel of her county, GA_Rep_4 similarly said “long term 
roots in the County count for a lot” when asked about factors that would make for a successful 
candidate.  GA_Rep_3 also stressed the importance of long-term roots in the community and 
discounted the role of the county party organization when describing candidates who come 
forward to run for office: 
So far in my experience they have not necessarily been involved in the local party.  […] 
What they tend to be are members of local, well-established families that have been here 
for many generations. And they may have had a [relative] who was in politics in the 
past. And it's almost as if, one day they wake up and go, ‘Well, it's my turn. I'm going to 
step up.’ And they kind of do it out of […] wanting to make the County better, and also, 
with the knowledge that they have some name equity that they can build on. 
(GA_Rep_3, 1/17/2020) 
 
GA_Rep_7 explained some types of community involvement that would make for a 
good GOP candidate in her small, rural county. 
We would like for somebody to have a religious affiliation because in a community like 
this, that is very important. That's how people get to know people, is through their 
church activities. And then their civic activity, whether it's they’re a member of the 
Chamber or whether they're a member of Rotary, Kiwanis, Lyons, you know, just to 
know that they have had a civic outreach. (GA_Rep_7, 2/4/2020) 
 
When asked about certain professional backgrounds, she mentioned some examples, but 
emphasized that one’s profession was not a major factor in assessing a potential candidate. 
No, we don't look at that as much. […] we've had dairy farmers, we've had 
businesspeople like in insurance, and we have military background people. […] We 
don't look for a certain profession. No. (GA_Rep_7, 2/4/2020) 
 
Variation by Party in Types of Civil Society Engagement and in Gendered Ways 
 While active community engagement was mentioned as important by most interviewees, 
the types of engagement varied across parties and in gendered ways, adding credence to the 





Democratic chairs tend to mention professional and civic backgrounds of potential candidates 
that are more female-dominated (e.g. education, women’s rights) compared to those mentioned 
by Republican chairs (e.g. law enforcement, business owners).  This section further 
demonstrates the gendered differences in party networks, which are especially evident in GA. 
Democratic party committees in Georgia have experienced some revival since the 2016 
election and Stacey Abrams’ 2018 gubernatorial campaign, even in the Republican stronghold 
counties.  Civil society activity and support from the state party organization are major factors 
that emerged as contributing to this revitalization.  Both these factors suggest a supportive 
infrastructure for female candidate emergence in the Democratic party across Georgia in the 
form of grassroots women’s activism on the local level and established female candidate 
recruitment groups on the state level. 
Several of the chairs mentioned that local women’s groups formed after the 2016 
presidential election, inspired by the Women’s Marches of 2017 and including individuals who 
had not necessarily been politically active before.  This is consistent with recent research about 
the nature of the resistance to the Trump administration since 2016 and the increased civic 
activism of women (Gose and Skocpol 2019; Putnam and Skocpol 2018).  GA_Dem_4 discussed 
the idea that the Republican Party has a “suburban mom problem” and discussed the group that 
formed in her county and how it has led to at least two current candidacies. 
There's at least 500 people in that group. And it was just started from three women who 
decided to get together and they were all like-minded. And now one of the cofounders is 
the person who's running for our state house or state Senate. So she's running for office 
and another one of the [members] is the other person who's running for our house seat. So 
these women are not only organizing, they took it upon themselves to do that, but now 






 Similarly, GA_Dem_1 mentioned the activity of both new and long-standing women’s 
groups as influential in reviving the county party committee.  Previously the committee had not 
been active and very few Democratic candidates even ran for office.  Now the committee is 
trying to capitalize on the resistance groups and formalize candidate recruitment. 
There were some women's organizations that formed over the last five or so years, 
especially after Trump was elected, that wanted to reach out and really target women to 
run […] it was called “Her Term.” […] they're out of Atlanta. […] their thing is to get 
women to run and to support them when they run. There's also “Georgia Win List.” […] 
They've been around more than 20 years and their sole purpose is to get pro-choice 
women elected. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019) 
 
 Her Term and Georgia Win List are state-wide organizations, which are addressed next, 
but local women’s activity is also a factor in GA_Dem_1.  The chairperson discussed a local 
group that formed from women meeting at the local satellite Women’s March in 2017: 
We had a local women's group that formed after Trump got elected and […] it's all local 
women. We, within the span of a year, we had over 400 members. (GA_Dem_1, 
11/12/2019) 
  
These quotes were about more recent activity, but the state-wide infrastructure for 
recruiting female candidates in Georgia has been robust and well-developed over the long-term.  
In addition to Her Term and Georgia Win List, several chairs mentioned the Georgia Federation 
of Democratic Women, which is focused on electing Democratic women throughout the state.  It 
has been around for over 20 years with local chapters in some counties.  However, they are more 
active in places where the Democratic party is more competitive.  For example, when asked 
about the group’s involvement in her county, GA_Dem_3 said: 
No, nothing. […] So those groups exist but they have not in my experience here been 
interested in our County or Northwest Georgia generally. […] it has not been a political 






In contrast, GA_Dem_2 has a more established Democratic party and does have a local 
chapter of the group, which has been active in recruiting candidates especially within the last few 
years as the county became more competitive for Democrats.  Yet, the feeling of the chair is that 
the group is most active right around election time, and not necessarily a constant presence 
within the county committee. 
I also asked about women’s groups in the Republican sphere.  Several chairs mentioned 
the Georgia Federation of Republican Women.  Some of the counties had local chapters of this 
group, but the nature of the group is not necessarily similar to the women’s groups on the 
Democratic side.  The GA Federation of Republican Women was described as promoting 
Republican candidates generally as well as other GOP causes, rather than focusing on getting 
female Republicans into elective office.  GA_Rep_2 summed up the nature of the group’s work, 
and this was consistent with other chairs’ descriptions: 
[the nature of their work is] mainly supporting the election […] of Republican 
candidates. […] I have not seen – [but] I'm not a party to everything -- any active 
recruitment of Republican women. Encouraged? Yes. […] They are definitely 
supported.  Actively recruited? Not in this part of the world. (GA_Rep_2, 1/17/2020) 
 
 In the interviews with New York county chairs, women’s groups came up sporadically, 
but there was no obvious, longstanding network of female candidate recruitment groups on the 
Democratic side like in Georgia.  GOP chairs in NY also did not emphasize the role of women’s 
groups in a significant way. 
Aside from women’s groups, the chairs of GA_Dem_1 and GA_Dem_5 mentioned 
some additional differences between the civil society contexts of each party.  GA_Dem_1 said, 
 our Chamber of Commerce definitely leans Republican. pretty much every social 
organization in this area is really flooded with lots of Republicans. The only ones that 
aren't are […] the ones that work with issues that deal with poverty […] All the big, like 





can get invited to speak […] where we never get invited to speak. (GA_Dem_1, 
11/12/2019) 
 
In terms of professional backgrounds that may be helpful, GA_Dem_5 said this: 
Well, we have a couple of big businesses in town. [names insurance and financial 
services businesses]. And so they employ a lot of people […] but it tends to be more of 
the Republicans that come from that kind of a background. And the Democrats 
sometimes come from backgrounds of nonprofits. […] 
another source of candidates that tend to be successful here -- now that I'm thinking 
about it, a couple of the Democratic candidates […] share this in common -- and that is 
military experience. It's hugely beneficial to have had some military experience to the 
voters in the South, specifically Republicans, but also Democrats. (GA_Dem_5, 
1/13/2020) 
 
Networking with civil society organizations was important for the party chair in the 
large county, GA_Rep_6.  He provided many insights into the civil society context of both 
parties in Georgia from his perspective.  The following quotes identify several types of civic 
engagement that are relevant to Republican candidates, and also address perceived differences 
between the two major parties with respect to the nature of group networks within them.  He 
mentions that other civic groups may push candidates to run for office without necessarily 
engaging with the county party organization beforehand, which is a mechanism suggested in my 
theory of candidate emergence. 
It's just all about networking. It's getting out. It's meeting people. […] I do my best to try 
to keep primaries from happening. But there's always those people who've never been 
involved in the party, don't even know that the party exists, really, but they want to run 
for office. They've always voted Republican. So they go down and they qualify for that 
office. And they've talked to maybe their homeowners association, or they've talked to 
their fellow members of the Kiwanis or Rotary club, or they've been involved in [local] 






I asked if there are any formal connections between these groups he mentioned and the 
GOP party organization and he said not really, but these groups may be involved in recruiting 
candidates independently. 
There may be a little bit of crossover, […] but in terms of anything formal, or even kind 
of a loose association, there isn't one. […] And that's part of the challenges you have in 
candidate recruitment […] -- the party's not necessarily the only one doing it. 
(GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020) 
 
I asked if dynamics were similar on the Democratic side from his perspective and he 
mentioned that the Democratic Party seems to have more formalized connections to allied 
groups. 
Democrats more so than Republicans have a lot more issue groups that are friendly with 
the party but not part of the party. We only have a handful of advocacy groups.  But 
everything from Indivisible to Act Blue to […] MoveOn.org and all that -- we see a lot 
of Democrat candidates […] coming out of those allied organizations. It's rare that you 
see a Democratic candidate say, ‘Oh, I was a member of the Kiwanis and the [local] 
business association, so I think it's time to run for office’. (GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020) 
 
NY_Rep_5 had a similar impression: 
If somebody rises up out of a community group, that usually I think happens more on the 
Democratic side than the Republican side. […] I think more people who are in social 
organizations maybe lean Democrat.  Not Rotary or something like that, but more 
activist organizations lean Democrat than Republican it seems. (NY_Rep_5, 2/13/2020) 
 
When asked about groups that would be more likely to be in the Republican committee’s 
network, NY_Rep_1 said: 
Sportsmen's clubs are definitely more [Republican] leaning because of the second 
amendment positions they have. […] you know, fire department members and 
ambulance corps members -- there's a [partisan] blend with them, but generally more 
towards Republican. I think people that are actively involved in […] school activities 
may be more leaning left. they want more things in school for their kids, so they want 
higher taxes, […] same thing with youth recreation. […] I think there's definitely, if you 
look at various civic groups, you may find the political leanings of folks that are 





NY_Rep_7 had a similar take.  In addition to law enforcement backgrounds, he 
mentioned the following groups as more likely to be in the Republican orbit: 
There's a county Fish & Game League and then each one of the towns, for the most part, 
it has its own Fish & Game that are quite well-represented on my committee. […] I have 
committeemen who are part of the Lion's club, VFWs. You'd see, oftentimes people 
coming out of the military, wanting to become involved. […] So, I see a lot of retired 
military, that kind of thing. (NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020) 
 
Variation by State in Importance of Unions for Democratic Party Organizations 
 Despite declining membership and the rise of right to work laws over the years, unions 
remain important stakeholders in American politics, especially within the Democratic Party as 
seen in Chapter 3.  Their membership can be quite gendered depending on the industry.  For 
example, given occupational segregation by sex, teacher and nursing unions are more female-
dominated, while trade and police unions are typically male-dominated.  Unions in retail and 
service industries and some public sectors unions may be more balanced.  During the 
interviews, I asked about the roles that various unions play in party networks.  As expected, 
unions are not much of a factor on the Republican side, but there were some interesting findings 
on the Democratic side. 
 Unions of all types were not major political players in the Georgia counties for which I 
conducted interviews29.  In contrast, in New York, some Democratic party leaders emphasized 
the importance of unions in their party networks.  This is not surprising since, according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, New York has among the highest union membership rates in the 
country (21%), while Georgia has among the lowest (4.1%). 
 





Within NY, there was variation in terms of whether unions were relevant and in how 
different types of unions interact with party organizations.  Chairs of the larger NY counties30, 
which are also urban or urban/rural mix counties, emphasized the importance of unions in their 
networks.  Unions were typically less relevant in the smaller, more rural counties. 
Interestingly, NY Democratic chairs described a clear contrast between teachers unions 
and trade unions (e.g. electricians, construction) regarding how these groups are integrated into 
the party organizations.  Teachers unions were seen as mainly lobbying groups, who would 
advocate for favored policies regardless of which party holds a given seat.  Thus, party chairs 
indicated that teachers unions are not deeply integrated into Democratic Party organizations.  
For example, interviewees mentioned that teachers unions may endorse Republican candidates 
in Republican stronghold areas.  Perceptions of trade unions were much different, as these are 
seen to be more embedded within the Democratic Party.  For example, where trade unions are 
more relevant, union representatives may sit on candidate interview committees and party chairs 
make sure that union leaders approve of particular candidates before giving endorsements.  
Chairs could recall instances when trade union leaders suggested potential candidates to party 
leadership, but they said that this typically would not happen with teachers unions.  With respect 
to female representation, this suggests that the strength of female-dominated teachers unions 
may have a weaker positive effect on female candidate emergence compared to the negative 
effect of male-dominated union strength.  This would line up with the quantitative results, 
which showed a more dramatic negative relationship between male-dominated GCSCs and 
female candidacies. 
The chair of NY_Dem_1 cited union support as the first factor necessary for a successful 
Democratic candidate: 
 





Well, the first factor is that the labor unions are going to be willing to support the 
candidate. And anytime we have a candidate that has success, it's because labor money 
helped to fuel the campaign. You know, there aren't a lot of big givers in rural areas, and 
so if labor's willing to get in and help well then it's going to be enough money to run a 
successful campaign. (NY_Dem_1, 1/31/2020) 
 
He was specifically referring to unions for electrical workers (IBEW), steel workers, 
operating engineers, as well as civil service unions (CSEA).  In contrast, the NY State United 
Teachers (NYSUT) union has been less closely aligned with the Democratic party organization 
in NY_Dem_1, and I heard the same from a few other Democratic chairs in NY.  They felt that 
NYSUT focuses more on lobbying and would typically back whoever would be most likely to 
win, regardless of party, as long as they could convince him/her to support NYSUT’s favored 
policies.  This was a common dynamic described by the Democratic chairs of counties in NY 
where unions were relevant.  Male-dominated trade unions were more embedded within the 
party’s organization.  For example, union representatives may sit on the party’s candidate 
interview or vetting committees.  On the other hand, the teachers unions tended to stay more at 
arms length and focused on lobbying and supporting candidates with the highest chance of 
winning, whether Democrat or Republican.  For example, NY_Dem_1 went on to say: 
NYSUT only wants to get involved in races that are winnable, very winnable, very 
competitive races. […] or they want to get behind the Republican if they feel like, ‘Hey, 
there's no chance of the Democrats winning’. (NY_Dem_1, 1/31/2020) 
 
Similarly, regarding teachers unions, NY_Dem_11 said: 
Around here they are more than likely to endorse a Republican just because they think 
the Republican’s gonna win. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020) 
 
The chair of NY_Dem_3 described dynamics between the party committee and local 





Teamsters).  He does have relationships with teachers, nurses, and public sector unions as well, 
just not as close. 
I usually have people from the unions on my interviews committee. […] So when we 
interview candidates, I make sure I have a representative from the Teamsters or the 
carpenters or the local unions within our party to be part of our process. […] so when we 
select candidates, I can say to the unions, ‘Look, I had two members of the union on the 
interview committee. They agreed with it’. So, that's something that I've been able to do 
locally. I do go to the union breakfast. I do go to some of their meetings, so we have a 
good relationship with them. (NY_Dem_3, 2/1/2020) 
 
 
Professional Backgrounds – Nuanced Relevance 
 When asked if certain professional backgrounds would be more or less indicative of a 
high-quality candidate, most party leaders in both states and parties said that this is not a major 
factor they would consider.  Aside from certain offices requiring specific professional expertise 
or credentials (e.g. district attorney, coroner) chairs felt that professional background was not 
crucial in evaluating or recruiting potential candidates.  This is somewhat surprising given the 
evidence presented thus far supporting the idea of gendered civil society contexts, of which 
groups tied to professions and industries are important components.  Moreover, much of the 
female candidate emergence literature focuses on “pipeline careers” – those careers that are 
most common among members of Congress or state legislators including law, business, 
education, and political activism (Lawless and Fox 2010, 30).  Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) 
show that focusing on those traditional pipeline careers may be too narrow because pipeline 
careers are not necessarily the same for male and female legislators, which makes sense given 
the level of occupational segregation by sex in the labor market shown in Chapter 3.  Given this 





emergence with the perspectives of interviewees claiming that professional background was not 
important in and of itself in assessing candidate quality? 
It seems that professional background is important in several indirect ways, based on 
other issues mentioned by interviewees along with the evidence for gendered civil society 
contexts presented in this project.  In terms of GCSC, professional background may be 
important for candidate emergence insofar as one’s career leads to certain patterns of group 
membership and community or political activities.  One’s career is also likely correlated with 
different resources necessary for running for office.  Indeed, one’s resources of time, money, 
and civic skills (i.e. communication and organizational capacities) are related to various modes 
of political activity (Brady et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001). 
Several interviewees emphasized the importance of a prospective candidate’s resources 
in evaluating his/her potential for success – two of the crucial resources being money and time.  
One’s profession is clearly linked to these resources, or lack thereof.  Given the centrality of 
money in politics in the US, it was not surprising that several chairs mentioned the importance 
of money in campaigning when assessing candidates.  Could the candidate put some of his/her 
own money into the campaign?  Is s/he comfortable asking for donations, and does s/he have a 
network of people that could contribute?  For example, NY_Dem_2 said the following. 
The casual observer thinks parties can kind of underwrite somebody's campaign. We 
can't.  I don't know any Democratic organization, including the New York State 
Democratic Committee, that can fully underwrite somebody's campaign.  So you've got 
to have the discussion with the person. How much are you going to put in yourself? 
Because if you're not going to invest in yourself, don't expect anybody else to invest in 
you.  And how much are you shamelessly willing to dial for dollars?  Because you're 
going to have to do that.  You've got to raise that money, the bulk of it you've got to 
raise it on your own. […] That's going to make you an attractive candidate to somebody. 






Certain professions are associated with more wealth and time flexibility than others.  For 
instance, lawyers may have the opportunity to build up substantial personal wealth and may 
have the ability to take on fewer clients during a campaign than workers in other occupations.  
In addition, workers in some careers may be more inclined to engage in related volunteerism, 
activism, or associations that would get them out in the community and increase their name 
recognition and donor networks.  Another Democratic chair in NY discussed the ways that 
profession is tied to level of resources, and how this affects candidate emergence. 
I don't think you can […] categorize them and say, you know, this is the profession that's 
always gonna get elected.  Everyone says that we elect too many attorneys, […] but 
attorneys arguably have more cash on hand and have more personal financial security to 
be able to dedicate their time to campaign.  So it's a matter of financial stability that 
dictates a lot of whether or not an individual runs for office, because it takes a lot of 
money to run […] a campaign.  So you typically don't see single moms who make 
$25,000 a year; [they] aren't chomping at the bit to run for office, for a state assembly 
job that's $130,000 a year because they simply cannot.  They're barely making by right 
now and they can't take off from their two jobs in order to go campaign.  It's not feasible, 
so they're not going to run.  (NY_Dem_4, 2/3/2020) 
 
In addition to resource differences, career paths may also be associated with partisan 
preferences.  As Andersen (1999) terms it, careers that are “close to government” such as those 
in healthcare, education, and social services, which are female-dominated, may also be more 
closely aligned with Democratic policies that support a more expansive welfare state31.  
Andersen (1999) found some evidence of this relationship between career and partisan 
preferences.  Thus, profession-to-politics pipelines seem to have important implications for 
candidate emergence with respect to resources, networks, partisanship, and gender, even if party 
 
31 Of course, there is variation in preferences within fields.  For example, in the healthcare industry, physicians 
associations like the American Medical Association have often worked to resist a more expansive role for 
government in healthcare (Hacker 2002) and currently advocates incremental reform (https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/patient-support-advocacy/ama-vision-health-care-reform).  In contrast, the largest nurses 






leaders are not consciously considering professional backgrounds when seeking out and 
assessing candidates. 
  
2. Candidate Recruitment by Party Leaders 
Overwhelmingly Informal Recruitment and High Reliance on Self-starters 
 Candidate recruitment by party leaders is an important factor in candidate emergence 
(Sanbonmatsu 2006; Lawless and Fox 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 
2013).  Across most interviewees, candidate recruitment was described as a mainly informal 
process and most chairs relied heavily on individuals who come forward on their own to run for 
office (i.e. self-starters).  Because of the political ambition gender gap explained previously, ad 
hoc candidate recruitment and reliance on self-starters are detrimental to female candidate 
emergence because women on average have a lower likelihood of running for office to begin 
with, compared to men.  
In Georgia, some Democratic chairs are making efforts to institute more formal 
recruitment processes, but most of these efforts are very recent.  Some examples include one 
chair developing a candidate recruitment guide, a few standing recruitment committees, and 
some semi-formal processes like going through voter rolls to identify potential candidates and 
maintaining spreadsheets with their names.  For example, GA_Dem_3 said: 
There’s been a constant effort to recruit people.  So […] all through the year we have 
conversations with people and we make lists of who we think might run.  We have a 
spreadsheet we created. […] We researched whether they voted Democrat or not. […] In 
Georgia, people don’t actually register as Democrat.  The only mechanism we have to 
identify if people are Democrats other than themselves identifying or coming to our party 






Some Democratic committees in New York also had some more formal processes such 
as interview and vetting committees for potential candidates.  However, these procedures were 
mainly used to determine party endorsements or to vet candidates after they have come forward 
on their own rather than initiating the recruitment process.  One NY Democratic chair explained 
his ideal recruitment approach versus what actually occurs. 
I know how to recruit candidates. I mean, you gotta look out into the community and 
find out who's involved in Rotary and Soroptimist and local nonprofits and boards and 
find people that are really popular in that regard. Find out whether they'd be willing to 
run.  But nobody does that here. […] We haven't had even anything close to a 
sophisticated recruitment program. (NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020) 
 
On the Republican side in both states, reliance on self-starters – those who voluntarily 
step forward -- seemed even more prominent, and when recruitment did occur it was largely 
based on personal connections of the chair or party committee members.  All of the Republican 
chairs I spoke with in Georgia described candidate recruitment as either completely informal or 
something the committee does not do.  In fact, two of the chairs even felt that actively recruiting 
candidates to run would violate the party rule requiring neutrality before nomination.  When 
asked if the county committee actively recruits candidates, the chair of GA_Rep_2, who has been 
involved with the county party for a long time, simply said: 
No, [… we’re] not inclined to do that sort of thing. We support those who volunteer. 
(GA_Rep_2, 1/17/2020) 
 
Regarding active recruitment, GA_Rep_4 said: 
No we do not do active recruiting and that's partly because of the state party rule, we 
cannot endorse any candidate for office until they have been through the primary 
process, and then we are allowed to endorse whoever the Republican candidate it is. But 






The chair of the largest county of my interviews, GA_Rep_6, explained that the county 
party there does engage in recruitment but described it as “very informal” and “a hodgepodge of 
tactics and strategies.”  This chair had an interesting perspective about the general low party 
strength of the Republican Party in Georgia and the South more generally, and how it may 
hinder efforts to formalize candidate recruitment and other party activities. 
I've heard from friends of mine up North there, it's much more formalized -- the whole 
party structure. It's more formalized, more organized. Party chairs have the ability to 
appoint individuals to actual government bodies. I can appoint someone to the Board of 
Elections, but that's it. I think in some states my position would be paid while in Georgia 
and most of the South a position like county chair is completely voluntary. (GA_Rep_6, 
1/24/2020) 
 
The interviews revealed another factor that may hinder female candidate emergence on 
the Republican side.  Several chairs in Georgia32 emphasized that ideological conservativism 
and adherence to Republican principles were very important characteristics for a successful 
Republican candidate in their countries.  This could possibly work against female candidate 
emergence in at least two ways.  First, research shows that larger proportions of women identify 
as liberal or moderate compared to conservative, so the pool of conservative women is 
somewhat smaller (Norrander and Wilcox 2008; Thomsen 2015).  However, there are plenty of 
very conservative women out there who could be viable Republican candidates.  Second, the 
perception that women are more likely to be liberal or moderate may introduce bias into 
candidate evaluation and selection processes.  GOP county chairs or committee members who 
see conservativism as a crucial factor for candidate success, may be less likely to promote 
female candidacies because they are less likely to see a woman as a strong conservative 
compared to male alternatives, whether consciously or unconsciously.  For example, in talking 
 





about the gender imbalance of the Republican committee in his county (he estimated about 
70/30 male/female membership), NY_Rep_7 said, 
The reality is that there's probably more liberal females [here] than there are males. I 
mean, that's just the makeup. if you look at, you know, the media, your teachers, […] 
you get into the human services field and you know, it's 70%, sometimes 80% females, 
and oftentimes that they're more liberal-minded. That's just the reality of it. (NY_Rep_7, 
2/18/2020) 
 
Variation in Importance of Party Involvement as Precursor for Candidates 
 Generally, prior involvement with the local party committee was not an important 
precursor for successful candidates according to the interviewees.  Only a couple chairs 
mentioned that being involved in the committee would be an asset and some others actually felt 
that party involvement may be detrimental to candidates in their counties.  NY chairs were more 
likely to say that party involvement was important, but it was not really emphasized as a major 
factor as compared to other forms of community involvement.  For example, the chair of 
NY_Dem_11 said, 
Constantly at County committee meetings we're saying, talk to people you know who 
seem civically minded. They don't have to be political. Some of the best candidates are 
people who are really active in community service type organizations rather than 
political ones. We're constantly trying to get folks to think in terms of candidate 
recruitment, but it's an uphill climb. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020) 
 
The chair of GA_Rep_6 discussed some specific examples of candidates who won 
elective office and emphasized the critical importance of community engagement, while 
discounting the role of party engagement. 
What you're looking for in a candidate is you need someone who's well rounded. your 
successful candidates will not usually be the person who all they've done in terms of 
civic engagement is been a good party person. I've seen it happen over and over again -- 
where candidates have basically courted the party vote [and] had huge support within the 
party. […] Then when it comes time for the actual election and the 99% of Republican 
voters who are not engaged in the party vote, [these candidates] end up in third, fourth, 





to be successful, you probably need to be involved in a lot more. And in addition to 
those basic civic associations -- you know, the big clubs, Rotaries and Kiwanis -- there's 
also business associations -- the realtors have a business association; […] there’s the 
county bar association for lawyers. I mean, pick your profession and there's probably a 
group of people meeting in the county, which is a great way to start a campaign. 
(GA_Rep_6, 1/24/2020) 
 
Prior party involvement was more likely to be cited as an important precursor for 
candidacies in NY compared to Georgia.  For ex, NY_Rep_7 said the following. 
Oftentimes, people are kind of groomed for these positions. You have to somewhat wait 
your turn. It can be disconcerting to a committee if somebody with no experience 
whatsoever, just steps forward and tosses their hat in the ring against somebody that's 
putting the time in and supported the committee and worked to get to a certain position. 
(NY_Rep_7, 2/18/2020) 
 
NY_Rep_6 also mentioned that many candidates emerge from the party committee.  A 
few NY chairs echoed this idea of candidates “waiting their turn” and putting the time in while 
working for the committee.  Given that NY has stronger party structures, this state variation is 
not surprising.  On the other hand, NY_Rep_3 said the following, though he did emphasize a 
contrast between local and state or higher-level positions: 
I think, a lot of people would assume the first thing you're looking for is party loyalty. 
But honestly, that's probably not the first quality we are looking for. […] For local 
candidates, we're looking for people who are community-minded, who want to do this 
for the right reason. […] We look for people who really, genuinely want to work on 
behalf of the community. […] We're looking for people who are well known, who are 
obviously, smart, well-spoken -- traits that we think of as electable. And really I think 
political issues are probably the lowest on the list, on the local level. […] And so I'm 
more concerned about people understanding finance or understanding operations or 
understanding public safety or some aspect of what's important to run a community. I'm 
less worried about what the political values are.  
[…] Now you're starting to get into a higher-level position where it is now more 
politically driven -- the Assembly, the Senate, congressional -- now these issues become 
a lot more based on ideology. So those factors do change. I mean electability is still very 
important. And all those things we talked about having connections to the communities 
and having a network.  But now when you get on the higher level, now you're looking at 
some more about what their political philosophy is. You're looking at their ability to 





Perception of Social Stigma Impeding Recruitment Efforts for Democratic Chairs 
 Several chairs on the Democratic side mentioned issues of social stigma that may deter 
the recruitment of high quality candidates in their counties.  These tended to be smaller rural 
counties in both Georgia and New York.  The chairs felt that being openly affiliated with the 
Democratic “brand” could have negative personal or professional repercussions, and thus 
deterred potentially competitive candidates from running for office.  Several Georgia 
Democratic chairs I spoke with mentioned social pressure and potential socioeconomic 
repercussions for openly affiliating with the Democratic Party that hindered candidate 
recruitment.  All the GA Democratic chairs, except for GA_Dem_2, mentioned this.  For 
instance, the chair of GA_Dem_3 said: 
There's a segment of the population that thinks that this is a Republican area and that it's 
not okay to be a Democrat.  […] I've had people tell me ‘I will never tell people I'm a 
Democrat because I will lose business.’ (GA_Dem_3, 11/14/2019) 
 
Similarly, the chair of GA_Dem_1, who had also run for office recently, said: 
Even though people have kind of come out of the closet more being a Democrat, I still 
have businesses that are Democrat-owned that will not support me visibly or financially 
because they're afraid they'll go out of business. (GA_Dem_1, 11/12/2019) 
 
This perception of social stigma affects the party’s ability to recruit high quality 
candidates.  For instance, of potential candidates, the chair of GA_Dem_4 said: 
They're not hesitant to run because they won't win. They're hesitant to run because of the 
repercussions in their personal lives and professional life […] for running as a Democrat. 
(GA_Dem_4, 11/14/2019) 
 
She mentioned a fundraiser that the party held, which was ultimately unsuccessful due to the 





Even key members of our party who owned businesses were afraid that if they were 
sponsors that it would somehow hurt their […] businesses because of that. (GA_Dem_4, 
11/14/2019) 
 
Even the chair of GA_Dem_5, where the Democratic party is somewhat more competitive 
mentioned the social stigma against affiliating with the Democratic Party in parts of the county, 
especially before the 2016 election: 
It was almost like you couldn't really be a public Democrat. You could, but it could affect 
your employment. It could affect how people looked at you. (GA_Dem_5, 1/13/2020) 
 
Issues of stigma were also mentioned by a few Democratic chairs in small rural counties 
in New York.  For example, NY_Dem_7 explained that the major employer in her county – a 
GOP stronghold -- is local government, and to obtain and maintain a county job there’s an 
unspoken rule that one must be a registered Republican.  This pressure dissuades potentially 
qualified candidate from running as, or even openly supporting, Democratic candidates.  When 
asked if the pressure harms recruitment efforts the chair answered: 
Yeah, they're afraid. They're very much afraid because, um, if you have children in 
school or you have family members who work for one of the local governments, you can 
be harassed (NY_Dem_7, 2/5/2020) 
 
The chairs of two other small counties in NY (NY_Dem_9 and NY_Dem_11) said 
something similar regarding pressure to be Republican if one wants to work for or do business 
with local government,  
The other thing that people have a tendency to do is if they want a job in the County, 
they make sure they're registered Republican. That is slowly changing, but not enough 
as far as I'm concerned. (NY_Dem_9, 2/6/2020) 
 
We have [very few] lawyers in the entire County who are registered Democrats. There's 
a definite message that they get when they come to [the] county that is, if they want to 






Later the same chair said something similar and said that it “absolutely” hinders her ability to 
recruit candidates. 
something that you hear constantly is that people who work for the County government 
definitely feel under pressure to be registered Republicans. (NY_Dem_11, 2/7/2020) 
 
3. Assessment of Causal Mechanisms 
The theory proposed in this dissertation suggests two main ways that gendered civil 
society contexts and party organizations interact to influence female candidate emergence.  The 
first is the pull mechanism, by which party leaders reach out to allied groups in civil society to 
find and recruit candidates.  The second is the push mechanism, by which civil society leaders 
identify preferred candidates and suggest them to local party leaders of the party with which the 
group is more closely aligned.  There is another push mechanism, in which civil society leaders 
promote and recruit candidates, but not necessarily in conjunction with party leaders.  By 
interviewing party leaders, I could not explore this second push mechanism in depth, though a 
few party leaders did mention that it happens. 
Party Organizations Pull Candidates from GCSC 
The interviews did suggest that the pull mechanism is at work across states and parties, 
and many of the quotes already presented throughout this chapter provide evidence of this 
occurring.   However, on the Republican side this mainly happens through informal personal 
networks rather than through formal integration between certain groups and party organizations.  
Informal personal connections were also important for candidate emergence on the Democratic 
side, but interview data suggest that there are more formal ties between allied groups and 






Generally if we're talking about other civic groups, civic association groups, we're 
generally seeking those people out rather than the reverse. It's often the case that people 
don't even think of running for office or don't think they can. So we've got to convince 
them, you know, that that's an option that might actually work. (NY_Dem_8, 2/6/2020) 
 
Minimal Evidence that GCSC Groups Push Candidates Directly through Party Organizations 
To explore the push mechanism, I asked interviewees if civil society leaders would ever 
approach a party leader to suggest that an individual should run for office.  Although I found 
more evidence of this on the Democratic side rather than the Republican side, this mechanism 
seemed infrequent compared to other modes of candidate emergence, such as recruitment by 
party leaders or the reliance on self-starters.  On the Democratic side, in NY some Democratic 
chairs mentioned that trade unions would suggest candidates and in Georgia some women’s 
groups would do so as well.  When asked if teachers and nursing unions ever put forward 
candidates that they favor compared to trade unions, NY_Dem_3 said: 
They [teachers and nursing unions] have not. No, not really. […] there's candidates they 
favor, but nobody that they've come up to me and said, ‘Hey […], we've got a union 
representative who wants to run for office’. That's never happened. […] Yes. That does 




The interview data presented in this chapter provide rich insights into the existence and 
nature of gendered civil society contexts and how local party organizations navigate them with 
respect to candidate emergence.  Party leaders across states and parties emphasized the 
importance of civil society engagement when discussing both recruitment strategies and 
potential candidate assessments.  There were also clear contrasts between states and parties 





The types of groups commonly mentioned by chairs of each party seemed to fit well 
with the differences observed in the quantitative results presented in Chapter 3.  Democratic 
chairs identified key stakeholders in their networks including unions, women’s groups, 
nonprofits, education, and social justice and other activist groups.  Education, non-profit work, 
and women’s rights and civil rights activism are occupations and civic backgrounds that tend to 
be more common among female state legislators (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013, 23, 55).  In 
contrast, GOP chairs mentioned Chambers of Commerce, hunting clubs, churches, service clubs 
(e.g. Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions) along with backgrounds in law enforcement, military, or business.  
Many of these backgrounds are more common among male state legislators (Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu 2013, 23, 55). 
Moreover, chairs of both parties expressed the idea that the Democratic Party has a more 
robust network of allied groups, compared to the Republican Party.  This difference may help to 
explain why the quantitative models explained female candidate emergence on the Democratic 
side, but less so for the GOP.  Republican chairs tended to rely more on personal connections 
for candidate recruitment, or on candidates coming forward on their own.  With more 
institutional ties to allied groups and somewhat more formalized recruitment approaches, 
candidate emergence on the Democratic side may lend itself to more predictable patterns.  
Furthermore, the dependence on self-starters, who are more likely to be male due to the political 
ambition gender gap, likely accounts for some of the low female candidate emergence on the 
GOP side. 
State-level variations were most obvious in the Democratic Party interviews.   Unions 
were not important stakeholders in Georgia but played a prominent role in my discussions with 





candidate selection processes in some NY counties, while female-dominated unions were 
important, but to a lesser extent.  Moreover, Democratic chairs in Georgia described a strong, 
long-term network of “female representation policy demanders” (Crowder-Meyer and 
Cooperman 2018), that specifically work to increase female representation in the state.  Georgia 
Win List, Her Term, and the Georgia Federation of Democratic Women have all been working 
for many years in the state to encourage women’s political participation and female candidate 
emergence.  These two factors – the prominence of male-dominated unions in NY and networks 
of female representation policy demanders in GA – may help to explain why the Democratic 
caucus in GA has outperformed that in NY in terms of female representation. 
In relation to the concept of gendered civil society context, the interviews introduced 
some interesting ideas with respect to these women’s representation advocacy groups.  Groups 
like Her Term seem to serve as middlemen of sorts with respect to recruitment.  It appears that 
they rely on local party and community leaders to identify potential female candidates, and then 
the “women’s representation policy demanders” provide resources, training, funding, and 
support to help them be successful.  Thus, while I have considered the idea of women’s 
representation policy demanders to be somewhat of a competing theory to the GCSC, it seems 
that these may be complementary factors in explaining female candidate emergence.  I think 
future research could tackle how exactly these groups decide where to put their resources, and 
how reliant they are on the gendered civil society contexts and/or local party leaders in 
identifying candidates for recruitment and support.  Because it seems that the impact of these 
groups may be even greater where the Democratic Party is more competitive in GA, it would be 






Interviews also shed on light on some issues regarding party strength and causal 
mechanisms suggested in my theory.  Involvement with party organizations as a precursor for 
running for office was more important in New York, where parties are stronger, compared to 
Georgia.  This would suggest that party organizations in NY may do more gatekeeping when it 
comes to candidate emergence.  This could disadvantage women candidates (Sanbonmatsu 
2006), though that is not clear cut as I have discussed elsewhere in previous chapters.  In terms 
of causal mechanisms, interviewees did describe the “pull” mechanism, whereby party leaders 
network with civil society groups to identify candidates.  I did not find much evidence of a 
“push” mechanism, whereby civil society leaders suggest and promote candidates to party 
leaders. 
The data presented in this chapter support the idea that the gendered civil society context 
is a meaningful concept with respect to candidate emergence.  Moreover, the interviews uncover 
the many ways that party organizations interact with the GCSC to impact the dynamics of 
candidate recruitment.  The next chapter synthesizes the qualitative and quantitative findings 






Chapter 5 – Appendix 
Figure 5.9 – List of Interviews 
County Code/Alias State Party Date 
GA_Dem_1 Georgia Democratic 11/12/2019 
GA_Dem_2 Georgia Democratic 11/12/2019 
GA_Dem_3 Georgia Democratic 11/14/2019 
GA_Dem_4 Georgia Democratic 11/14/2019 
GA_Dem_5 Georgia Democratic 1/13/2020 
GA_Rep_1 Georgia Republican 1/13/2020 
GA_Rep_2 Georgia Republican 1/17/2020 
GA_Rep_3 Georgia Republican 1/17/2020 
GA_Rep_4 Georgia Republican 1/17/2020 
GA_Rep_5 Georgia Republican 1/21/2020 
GA_Rep_6 Georgia Republican 1/24/2020 
GA_Rep_7 Georgia Republican 2/4/2020 
NY_Dem_1 New York Democratic 1/31/2020 
NY_Dem_2 New York Democratic 1/31/2020 
NY_Dem_3 New York Democratic 2/1/2020 
NY_Dem_4 New York Democratic 2/3/2020 
NY_Dem_5 New York Democratic 2/3/2020 
NY_Dem_6 New York Democratic 2/3/2020 
NY_Dem_7 New York Democratic 2/5/2020 
NY_Dem_8 New York Democratic 2/6/2020 
NY_Dem_9 New York Democratic 2/6/2020 
NY_Dem_10 New York Democratic 2/7/2020 
NY_Dem_11 New York Democratic 2/7/2020 
NY_Rep_1 New York Republican 2/6/2020 
NY_Rep_2 New York Republican 2/12/2020 
NY_Rep_3 New York Republican 2/13/2020 
NY_Rep_4 New York Republican 2/13/2020 
NY_Rep_5 New York Republican 2/13/2020 
NY_Rep_6 New York Republican 2/14/2020 







Figure 5.10 – Email Solicitation for Recruiting Interviewees 
Dear _____, 
 
I hope this email finds you well.  My name is Colleen Burton, and I am a PhD candidate in 
Political Science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School in Syracuse, NY.  My dissertation 
research is about how local community groups and political party organizations influence who 
runs for political office.  As a county party chair, I am wondering if you would be willing to talk 
to me about the _____ County ________ Party Committee.  I am especially interested in the 
committee’s processes related to candidate recruitment and its interactions with local stakeholder 
groups in the community.  The interview should take between 30 and 60 minutes, and we could 
talk over the phone.  Please let me know if you would be willing to participate and if you have 
any questions or concerns.  I am happy to provide any additional information that you may need 





Colleen Dougherty Burton 












What you're looking for in a candidate is you need someone who's well rounded. […]  
So having been involved in the party as a candidate is great, but if you want to be 
successful, you probably need to be involved in a lot more. And in addition to those 
basic civic associations -- you know, the big clubs, Rotaries and Kiwanis -- there's also 
business associations -- the realtors have a business association; […] there’s the county 
bar association for lawyers. I mean, pick your profession and there's probably a group of 
people meeting in the county, which is a great way to start a campaign. (GA_Rep_6, 
1/24/2020) 
 
I know how to recruit candidates. I mean, you gotta look out into the community and 
find out who's involved in Rotary and Soroptimist and local nonprofits and boards and 
find people that are really popular in that regard. Find out whether they'd be willing to 
run.  But nobody does that here. […] We haven't had even anything close to a 
sophisticated recruitment program. (NY_Dem_6, 2/3/2020) 
 
I usually have people from the unions on my interviews committee. […] So when we 
interview candidates, I make sure I have a representative from the Teamsters or the 
carpenters or the local unions within our party to be part of our process. […] so when we 
select candidates, I can say to the unions, ‘Look, I had two members of the union on the 
interview committee. They agreed with it’. (NY_Dem_3, 2/1/2020) 
 
The reality is that there's probably more liberal females [here] than there are males. I 
mean, that's just the makeup. if you look at, you know, the media, your teachers, […] 
you get into the human services field and you know, it's 70%, sometimes 80% females, 
and oftentimes that they're more liberal-minded. That's just the reality of it. (NY_Rep_7, 
2/18/2020) 
 
 These four selected quotes from Democratic and Republican county party leaders in 
Georgia and New York reflect many of the dynamics of candidate emergence that the theory of 
gendered civil society context and party strength developed and tested in this dissertation intends 
to capture.  The concept of gendered civil society context refers to the many civil society groups 
from which candidates emerge, like the ones mentioned by the party chairs.  Importantly, the 
GCSC aims to define the gendered nature of these groups and how it affects candidate pipelines 





party organizations and gendered civil society contexts and helps to explain some of the 
observed cross-party and cross-state variations in female representation in the US.  In this 
chapter, I highlight some of the major findings derived from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses presented in previous chapters and discuss their broader implications.  I also offer some 
suggestions about how the ideas explored in this project can contribute to future research on 
female representation and female candidate emergence. 
 In Chapter 1, I identify a few gaps in the existing female representation research to which 
I sought to contribute through this project.  One weakness is the lack of attention to a broad array 
of civil society actors in influencing candidate emergence in general, and female candidate 
emergence in particular.  While “female representation policy demanders” like EMILY’s List 
have received much attention – and rightfully so – the gendered nature of other types of groups 
have not received much consideration.  The concept of gendered civil society context is meant to 
account for the broad swath of groups from which candidates emerge, and to address how these 
groups may influence the gendered nature of candidate pipelines.  As the party leader quotes 
emphasize, there are myriad groups from which candidates emerge, many of which are tied to 
industries or professions that are not gender-balanced, such as trades, law enforcement, 
education, or non-profits. 
 In addition to the qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 5, the findings of Chapter 3 
provide quantitative evidence to support the idea that the gendered civil society context varies by 
party and is directly related to female candidate emergence.  Regression analysis indicates that 
within the Democratic Party, more politically active female-dominated industry groups (e.g. 
teachers unions) are associated with more female candidates, while more politically active male-





running for office.  As the quote from NY_Dem_3 (2/1/2020) illustrates, the close relationships 
between male-dominated trade unions and Democratic party organizations in some places may 
inadvertently hinder female candidate emergence.  On the flip side, the lack of male-dominated 
unions coupled with the strong network of female representation policy demanders and other 
women’s groups within the Georgia Democratic Party’s gendered civil society context may have 
facilitated female candidate emergence in the state over the past decade, even before female 
representation became a more salient political issue. 
 The role of party organizations and party strength in female candidate emergence was 
another area of the literature to which this project sought to contribute.  While the quantitative 
tests for the party strength hypotheses, presented in Chapter 4, resulted in null findings, the 
qualitative data provide useful insights.  As the party leaders mention above, relationships 
between party organizations and civil society groups are important for candidate recruitment and 
emergence.  However, recruitment processes vary widely across local party committees.  Most 
interviewees emphasized informal recruitment through personal networks or relied more on 
candidates coming forward on their own.  Lack of formal recruitment processes was most 
pronounced on the Republican side in both Georgia and New York.  On the Democratic side 
there appeared to be more robust institutional ties between party organizations and stakeholder 
groups according to interviewees.  These factors may explain why the quantitative results are 
more robust for the Democratic Party. 
 The party strength results presented in Chapter 4 also suggest an alternative to the theory 
I proposed about stronger parties bolstering the effects of the gendered civil society context.  In 
Chapter 2, I suggest that stronger parties may amplify the GCSC, but in fact the reverse could be 





power to influence candidate selection.  This would be an interesting area for future research.  
Interviews with leaders of civil society groups would be useful for understanding how they 
navigate local politics, and the extent to which they engage in promoting candidates either 
through party organizations or independently. 
 In terms of broader implications, the evidence supporting the existence and relevance of 
gendered civil society contexts indicates that occupational patterns can influence diversity in 
representation in many ways.  Further investigating the indirect effects of careers on potential 
candidacies may lead to better understanding of how to encourage female candidate emergence.  
Party leaders and elected officials could focus on ways to provide the necessary resources for 
successful candidacies for individuals in careers that may not afford those resources 
automatically.  For example, more public campaign funding options, more funding available 
from party organizations, providing childcare or other services to increase time flexibility for 
candidates are all initiatives that could lead to more diverse pools of candidates and would 
likely enhance female candidate emergence.  These types of initiatives are already being 
implemented in some places (for example, https://cawp.rutgers.edu/use-campaign-funds-
childcare-expenses#Table).   In short, career backgrounds, which differ by gender, also differ in 
terms of resources necessary for successful candidacies.  Directly alleviating the resources 
disparities is likely to improve female candidate emergence and improve diversity in 
representation more generally. 
 Another way to improve female candidate emergence would be for parties to formalize 
their recruitment processes and engage with stakeholder groups in civil society more directly 
and intentionally.  This may also lead to better quality candidates in general for both parties, 





candidate.  Relying on self-starters and ad hoc recruitment methods reduces a party 
organization’s influence over candidate selection.  As explained in Chapter 1, compared to the 
European context, parties in the US have much less influence over candidate nomination due to 
the use of primary elections.  However, any informal power that US party organizations do have 
over candidate selection is further diminished when they rely on individuals stepping forward 
on their own.  Fostering relationships with stakeholder groups in civil society would be one way 
to cultivate candidate pipelines and reduce reliance on self-starters. 
 Going forward, the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 3 could be expanded in 
several ways.  While this initial study focused on open seat elections, future research could 
include elections with incumbents and challengers.  In addition to serving as a robustness check, 
this would allow for some analysis of gendered civil society contexts over time.  Since open 
seats occur sporadically and not necessarily in consecutive election cycles, over time analysis 
was not performed.  Also, assessing the industrial and occupational affiliations of individual 
contributors could be an interesting exercise.  This approach could potentially uncover more 
differences between the major parties.  For example, did GOP chairs emphasize the importance 
of personal networks in candidate recruitment because the Republican Party also tends to be 
more reliant on individual rather than group contributors? 
 Collecting additional qualitative data would also likely be a worthwhile endeavor.  More 
state case studies would be useful by providing additional elements of geographic and 
institutional variation.  For instance, conducting interviews in states with terms limits, 
multimember districts, or public campaign funding options would add to our understanding of 
how gendered civil society contexts and party organizations shape dynamics of female 





As noted previously, interviews with civil society leaders would also be valuable.  As 
GA_Rep_6 (1/24/2020) stated, when it comes to candidate recruitment “the Party’s not 
necessarily the only one doing it.”  Talking to civil society leaders, or former candidates who 
emerged from them, would uncover the dynamics of candidate emergence from a different 
angle.  Also, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the GA interviews suggest that women’s representation 
advocacy groups often rely on local party and community leaders to identify potential female 
candidates, and then the groups provide resources, training, funding, and support to help them 
be successful.  Future research could examine how these groups decide where to put their 
resources, and how reliant they are on the gendered civil society contexts and/or local party 
leaders in identifying candidates for recruitment and support. 
Overall, the results presented in this dissertation suggest that the theory of gendered civil 
society context does indeed provide a promising new explanation for female candidate 
emergence.  Various research avenues could be pursued to further develop the concept of GCSC 



















Consent Form to Participate in Research Study 
 
The purpose of this research project is to learn more about how community groups and political 
party organizations influence who runs for political office, and how political candidates decide to 
run for political office. 
 
You will be asked to answer questions and discuss formal and informal processes of your 
organization.  You will also be asked about your perceptions and experiences with these formal 
and informal processes.  This will take approximately 30 to 60 minutes of your time. 
 
Involvement in the study is voluntary.  You have the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time. 
 
Our discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your own 
words.  The audio files will only be heard by me for the purpose of this study.  If you feel 
uncomfortable with the recorder, you may ask that it be turned off at any time.  
 
All the information you provide for this study will be treated confidentially.  Your identity will 
remain anonymous in any report on the results of this research.  This will be done by changing 
your name and disguising any details of the interview which may reveal your identity or the 
identity of people about whom you speak.  Disguised extracts from your interview may be 
quoted in my academic writings (i.e. dissertation, scholarly presentations, published papers and 
books). 
 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research, please contact: 
 
Colleen Dougherty Burton 
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science 





By signing this consent form, I certify that I am over 18 years of age and that I agree to the terms 














Oral Consent Script for Participation in Research Study 
 
The purpose of this research project is to learn more about how community groups and political 
party organizations influence who runs for political office, and how political candidates decide to 
run for political office. 
 
You will be asked to answer questions and discuss formal and informal processes of your 
organization.  You will also be asked about your perceptions and experiences with these formal 
and informal processes.  This will take approximately 30 to 60 minutes of your time. 
 
Involvement in the study is voluntary.  You have the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time. 
 
Our discussion will be audio recorded to help me accurately capture your insights in your own 
words.  The audio files will only be heard by me for the purpose of this study.  If you feel 
uncomfortable with the recorder, you may ask that it be turned off at any time. 
 
Do you consent to audio recording?  
 
All the information you provide for this study will be treated confidentially.  Your identity will 
remain anonymous in any report on the results of this research.  This will be done by changing 
your name and disguising any details of the interview which may reveal your identity or the 
identity of people about whom you speak.  Disguised extracts from your interview may be 
quoted in my academic writings (i.e. dissertation, scholarly presentations, published papers and 
books). 
 
Do you have any questions or concerns about the research? 
 
Are you 18 years of age or older? 
 
How can I provide you with a copy of this consent script? 
 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research, please use the following 
information to contact me or the Office of Research Integrity and Protections of Syracuse 
University. 
 
Colleen Dougherty Burton 
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science 












Interview Protocol for Political Party Leaders 
 
- Does the local party organization actively recruit candidates? 
o How important is candidate recruitment in relation to other activities?  
 
- How do other Democratic (Republican) party organizations (state, national, etc.) affect 
local candidate recruitment? 
 
- With regards to your local party organization, what activities are involved in candidate 
recruitment? 
o Are there formal guidelines? What are they? 
o Are there informal practices? What are they? 
 
- Do you work with partners/stakeholders in civil society to recruit potential candidates? 
o If so, with which specific groups do you work? 
o Do any groups suggest candidates without your party organization’s solicitation? 
If so, which groups are more, or less, likely to do this? 
o Are potential candidates often affiliated with particular local community groups? 
If so, which groups? 
 
- Does your local party organization formally endorse candidates in primary elections? 
 
- Does your local party organization promote candidates in primary elections? If so, how? 
 
- As a leader/member of your organization, have you had any direct experience in 
recruiting candidates in the past?  If so, can you tell me about this experience? 
 
- Are members of your local party organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly 
balanced with regards to gender? 
 
- Are leaders of your local party organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly 
balanced with regards to gender? 
 
- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful political 
candidate in this area? 
 
- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running 
for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area?  Please explain. 
 
- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, 
or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area? Please explain. 
 
- Here is my contact information.  Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who 






Interview Protocol for Civil Society Leaders 
 
- Does your group engage in local politics?  If so, how? 
 
- Does your group see recruiting political candidates as important to your mission? 
o If so, what activities do you engage in to recruit candidates? 
o Are there any formal processes followed for candidate recruitment? 
o Are there any informal processes for this purpose? 
o Have you found any of these processes to be particularly successful?  Why, or 
why not? 
 
- Does your group work with local party officials regarding candidate recruitment? 
o If so, how? 
o With which party does your group typically work? 
 
- Do local party officials ever seek your recommendations for potential political 
candidates? 
o If so, how do you identify such individuals? 
 
- Is your group active in promoting preferred candidates during elections? 
o If so, what activities do you engage in to promote candidates? 
 
- As a leader/member of your organization, have you had any direct experience in 
recruiting or promoting candidates in the past? 
o If so, can you tell me about this experience? 
 
- Are members of your organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with 
regards to gender? 
 
- Are leaders of your organization mostly female, mostly male, or fairly balanced with 
regards to gender? 
 
- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful political 
candidate in this area? 
 
- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running 
for, or getting recruited for, office in this area?  Please explain. 
 
- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, 
or getting recruited for, office in this area? Please explain. 
 
- Here is my contact information.  Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who 






Interview Protocol for Candidates 
 
- What was the first office your ran for? 
 
- How did you decide to run for office?  Please tell me about your experience. 
 
- Were you recruited?  If so, by whom were you recruited?  Please tell me about your 
experience. 
o If you were recruited, what attributes or characteristics do you think may have 
made you an attractive candidate to the recruiter(s)? 
 
- Were you involved in any civil society groups prior to running for office? (These include 
unions, professional associations, community groups, advocacy groups, etc.) 
o If so, did this involvement affect your decision to run for office in any way? 
How? 
 
- Were you involved with your local political party organization prior to running for 
office? 
o If so, did this involvement affect your decision to run for office in any way? 
How? 
 
- As a former candidate, can you share any additional thoughts or experiences you may 
have about how political candidates are recruited in your local community? 
 
- Can you describe what factors or characteristics would make for a successful candidate in 
this area? 
 
- Do you think female candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running 
for, or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area?  Please explain. 
 
- Do you think male candidates would have any advantage or disadvantage in running for, 
or getting recruited for, office for your party in this area? Please explain. 
 
- Here is my contact information.  Please pass this along to any of your colleagues who 
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